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Kobayashi defends the Meijin title.

Feature Articles in this Issue

The Renaissance of Cho Chikun


In this issue we feature a special report on the dramatic comeback of Cho Chikun to the summit of the go world after a period out of the limelight.

Just a few years ago, when he held the top four titles, Cho Chikun was the dominant player on the Japanese go scene: he was the first player ever to hold the Kisei, Meijin, Honinbo, and Judan titles at the same time. However, triumph was soon followed by painful reverses: the loss of his titles and a disastrous traffic accident that handicapped him in his efforts to make a comeback.

This year has been a banner year for Cho: he has defended the Judan title he won last year and he has taken the Honinbo title from Takemiya, giving him his first big title in three years. Moreover, he didn't drop a game in either title match. He now holds three of the seven open titles, so his comeback is in full swing. Our report includes commentaries on all his Judan and Honinbo games.



Attacking the Two-Space Extension



The two-space extension of 1 and 3 is one of the most common formations in go. Every go player must have wondered at one time or another what was the best way of attacking this enemy position, but unfortunately the textbooks don't usually cover such middle-game problems. In this issue we remedy that, with an extensive analysis by Kamimura 8-dan of the standard methods for attacking the two-space extension.

The theoretical article is followed by ten problems presented by O Meien 8-dan and designed to test your ability to apply in practice the new techniques you have learned. Between them, Kamimura and O will greatly improve your ability to attack (and defend) this formation.

The front cover: A print dating from around 1861 by Toyokuni III of a courtesan playing go. This is number 28 in a series 'Portraits of 36 Celebrated Beauties'. From the collection of John Power.

Back cover: Cho Chikun and Takemiya, in Madrid to play the first game of the Honinbo title match, meet Juan Carlos, the King of Spain. (Photo courtesy of the Nihon Ki-in.)

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Go World News



Another triumph for Kobayashi

Kobayashi Meijin Crushes Challenge by Awaji

The 14th Meijin title match came to an anticlimactic end in the 5th game when Kobayashi Koichi crushed the challenger, Awaji Shuzo 9-dan, in 97 moves. The game ended at 10:53 in the morning of the second day. Kobayashi had invaded a large moyo and succeeded in living with so much profit that the game was hopeless for Awaji. The latter's play was not as spirited in this game as earlier in the series and it seems that he had become dispirited by his failure to find any chinks in Kobayashi's armour. We plan to publish a full report on the title match in our next issue.

Kato Evens Oza Match

Kato has drawn level with the challenger, Hane Yasumasa, in the 37th Oza title by winning the second game, played on 25 October, by 2 1/2 points. The third game will be played on 15 November.

Hane's surname means 'wing', which accounts for the cartoon by Ayusawa Makoto.



Hane: Part of my wing is missing.

Otake Wins First Game of Kisei Playoff

Otake Hideo has made a good start in the playoff to decide the Kisei challenger, defeating Cho Chikun in the first game, played on 2 November, by 8 1/2 points (Otake held white). The second game will be played on 30 November. If Otake wins the playoff, this will be his second challenge for the title (he lost 4-0 to Shuko in the 5th title in 1981) and the second title match between him and Kobayashi (the first was the 23rd Judan title in 1985, which Kobayashi won 3-0).

In the second semifinal, held on 19 October, Cho defeated Takemiya by 8 1/2 points.

Takemiya Wins Third TV Tournament

This may not be Takemiya's year for the big newspaper titles, but he is making up for that with his success in titles with shorter time limits. After taking the 2nd Fujitsu Cup (time allowance: three hours per player), he has now won his third TV title for the year. First, he won the NHK Cup, then the 1st Asia Cup, an international lightning go tournament, and now he had added a victory in the 22nd Haya-go (Lightning Go) Championship. In the final, played on 30 September, he defeated Kato Masao, taking revenge for his loss to Kato in the final of the same title last year. Takemiya also won the 11th title, in 1978.

Rin Is Challenger for 15th Tengen

In the playoff to decide the Tengen challenger, held on 10 October, Rin Kaiho defeated Hane Yasumasa 9-dan by 6 1/2 points to earn the right to make his first challenge for the Tengen title. This will also be Rin's chance to take

revenge on the title-holder, Cho Chikun, for his shut-out in this year's Judan title.



Ogawa Tomoko is to challenge Kusunoki's dominance in the Women's Honinbo title. Ogawa is the most popular woman go player in Japan and often appears not only in TV go programs but also in various other programs and in TV commercials. Her husband is the well-known actor Yamamoto Kei.

Ogawa to Challenge for 8th Women's Honinbo

For the fourth year in a row Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan will play in the title match for the Women's Honinbo title. Ogawa won this title from Kusunoki in 1986 (the 5th title), but lost it back to her the following year and last year made an unsuccessful challenge. Kusunoki and her older sister, Honda Sachiko 6-dan, have dominated this title, with the former winning it four times and the latter twice. Three of the title matches have featured clashes between the sisters. Ogawa's task is to take the title out of this formidable family (the third sister is Japan's top-rated woman player, Sugiuchi Kazuko, who won the Women's Championship four times in a row in the early 50s).

In the playoff to decide the challenger (25 October), Ogawa defeated Kobayashi Reiko 6-dan, the wife of Kobayashi Koichi. Kobayashi is the most successful woman player, having won a total of ten titles, most of them as Kitani Reiko (she is the daughter of Kitani Minoru). In recent

years she has been busy with raising her two children, but now they're getting old enough to look after themselves more (both are studying go), she has more time for go. Her good form up to the playoff in this title shows that she may be ready to make a comeback.



Kobayashi Reiko: the most successful woman player is showing new interest in extending her record number of women's titles. She dominated the Women's Championship, the predecessor of the Women's Honinbo, in the 1960's. Like her husband, Reiko is a whiz at life and death problems and can solve all but the most difficult ones virtually on sight. The editor once saw Kajiwara 9-dan, confronted with a large-scale problem concerning the status of a group in a game on which he was giving a public commentary, appeal to the Kobayashis, who happened to be in the audience (this is about 12 years ago) for help. They conferred for about two seconds, then gave the answer, but it took a lot of patient explanation before Kajiwara could grasp it.

Shuko Makes Comeback to Meijin League

After dropping out of the previous league, Fujisawa Shuko has made an immediate comeback. On 19 October he defeated Kobayashi Satoru by 9 1/2 points in the playoff to enter the 15th league. Shuko is known to be ambitious for one more triumph to cap his career; he enlivened the last league, so his fans will be happy to see him back in the new one.

On the same day Yoda Norimoto 7-dan

defeated Sakaguchi 9-dan by resignation to regain the place he held in the 10th league. Yoda set a record by becoming, at 18, the youngest player ever to enter a league, but he was knocked out unceremoniously with a 1-7 score. Yoda is now a mature 23, and this time he is expected to make more of an impression.

In the playoff for the third vacant place, held on 26 October, Otake Hideo defeated Kataoka 9-dan, so the player who used to be known as 'the Meijin tournament man', because he was one of the perennial stars of the league, is back after two absences.

All these three players are also appearing in the Honinbo league.

Kobayashi Chizu Wins Women's Kakusei

Kobayashi Chizu 5-dan won her first title in 11 years when she defeated Ogawa Tomoko 4-dan in the final, played on 8 September, of the 11th Kakusei Cup. Since winning the Women's Championship for three years in a row from 1976 to 1978, Kobayashi has been out of the limelight, but perhaps she was stimulated by the new developments in women's go, with the foundation of a new title, the Women's Meijin, and the appearance of new stars such as Miyazaki Shimako 2-dan, last year's Kakusei winner, and Aoki

Kikuyo 2-dan. Incidentally, she beat Miyazaki in the quarter-final.

Kobayashi Chizu's many overseas friends will be hoping that her comeback doesn't entail her cutting down on her regular annual visits to overseas go tournaments and festivals.

1990 Canadian Championship

The Quebec Association of Go Players will host the 1990 Canadian Open Go Championship in Montreal. The event will take place over the weekend of the 1st and 2nd September. Players interested in participating please contact:

David Vaughan, 4545, av. Pierre-de-Coubertin, C.P. 1000, Succursale M, Montreal, Quebec H1V 3R2. Tel. (514) 252-3032.

1989 European Go Championship

The European Go Championship held in Nis in Yugoslavia was the last tournament in the 1988-89 cycle to decide the European qualifier for the 3rd Fujitsu World Championship, to be held in Japan in 1990. Over 200 players participated, including many players from the USSR and a delegation of strong amateurs from Japan, led by Mr. Furuzono, one of the sponsors of the European Go Congress, of which the Championship is the main event.



A long time between tournament victories for Kobayashi Chizu.

For the first time since 1964 in Porrentruy, the championship was open to non-European players, who could compete with European players for the title of European Open Champion. The title of European Champion was reserved for European players, who also competed for the place in the 3rd Fujitsu Cup and rankings in the European Grand Prix.

For the Fujitsu Cup, each of the ten tournaments in the Grand Prix d'Europe yielded points for the best 15 finishers. Because he had already won six of these tournaments, Yoo Jong-su had an unassailable lead in the rankings. For deciding the place in the world championship, only the best three results were to count, with the European Championship yielding double the points for other tournaments. Matthew Macfadyen led the list here, but many other players still stood a fair chance of getting a game against a professional next year.

The European Championship was a ten-round tournament, played at the rate of one game a day, with three hours per player and one-minute byo-yomi. Favourites for the title included, besides Yoo and Macfadyen, some of the visiting Japanese amateurs, like Miss Nakamura Chikako, 1988 Japanese Women's Amateur Champion, and Sogabe Toshiyuki. The first big surprise was the victory of Robert Rehm of Hol-

land over Yoo in the 3rd round. In the 5th round, Sogabe defeated Macfadyen and Miss Nakamura lost to Alexei Lazarev, runner-up in 1987. After the first week Sogabe and Lazarev led the field. Lazarev lost to Sogabe in the 6th round, but in the next round Sogabe was defeated by Miss Nakamura, so now Sogabe, Macfadyen, and Nakamura led the field. Sogabe took the sole lead when he continued by defeating Yoo in the 8th round, while Miss Nakamura lost to Macfadyen, after which Macfadyen lost to Yoo in the 9th round. Sogabe won his remaining games to score 9-1 and become Open European Champion. Second to 4th places were decided on SOS points. Final placings after a very hectic tournament were:

1. Sogabe Toshiyuki 6-dan (Japan): 9-1
2. Matthew Macfadyen 6-dan (UK): 8-2
3. Nakamura Chikako 6-dan (Japan): 8-2
4. Yoo Jong-su 6-dan (Korea): 8-2
5. Inabe Yoshiko 5-dan (Japan): 7-3
6. R. Sachabudzinov 5-dan (USSR): 7-3
7. Valery Solovjov 6-dan (USSR): 7-3
8. Rade Petrovic 5-dan (Yugoslavia): 7-3
9. Frank Janssen 5-dan (Netherlands): 7-3
10. Ivan Detkov 6-dan (USSR): 7-3
11. Eguchi Akira 6-dan (Japan): 7-3

Continued on page 37

WORKSHOPS IN THE PRACTICAL, CREATIVE AND HEALING ARTS

GO WORKSHOP AT HOLLYHOCK



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
James Kerwin

A five-day workshop, July 9-14, at Hollyhock with James Kerwin, a professional shodan since 1978. Kerwin, a disciple of Iwamoto Kaoru, 9-dan, became the first

Westerner to enter the record books of professional tournament go when he won the 1-dan section of the 4th Kisei tournament in 1978. The workshop will be followed by dan-level and kyu-level tournaments.


Hollyhock is located on Cortes Island, 100 miles north of Vancouver, Canada in a beautiful West Coast beach setting. Tuition, plus full room and board \$585 (Canadian Dollars). Spouses and children welcome.

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The Renaissance of Cho Chikun



Back on top: Cho adds the Honinbo title to the Judan and Tengen.

Three years and a bit after losing the Kisei title, Cho Chikun is back in the winner's circle with a big title. His great rival, Kobayashi Koichi, who took the Meijin title from him in 1985 and the Kisei title from him in 1986, still holds those two titles, though in the case of the latter there was an interruption for two years while Kato took temporary custody, but Cho has made a come-

back in the Honinbo, a title he let slip from his grasp way back in 1983. This is his 11th big title (the three big titles are the Kisei, Meijin, and Honinbo, and they are defined as big titles because of the size of their prize money and the fact that two-day games are played in the title match), a record which puts him second only to Rin Kaiho, who is 14 years his senior. Rin has

won 13 big titles, even though he has not yet been successful in the Kisei title (see the box on page 13).

At 33, Cho is still quite young, so Rin's chances of holding on to the above record do not look good, but even so it has taken Cho a long time to recover from his disastrous accident in January 1986 (see GW42, page 2 and GW44, page 6 for full details). Even a year after the accident he was still feeling pain in his leg, and, as far as physical stamina is concerned, he may never again be as strong as he was in his 20s. For one thing, he has lost the extraordinary precision he used to display in byo-yomi, which was one of his greatest weapons; this may just be a part of growing older, but the accident probably had something to do with it. Be that as it may, he is unmistakably enjoying a renaissance in form recently, capped by his Honinbo success, and he may well go all the way back to the top. During November and December he will meet Otake Hideo in the playoff to decide the Kisei challenger, so he may get a return match with Kobayashi. At one time in 1983, Cho held all four of the top titles — the big three plus the Judan — the only player in history to achieve this feat. At the moment he holds three titles.

In this issue, we take a comprehensive look at the two title matches Cho has played so far this year: the Judan title match, in which he rebuffed Rin's challenge 3–0, and the Honinbo title match, in which he made his long-awaited comeback to the top, this time at the expense of Takemiya. Because there are so many games, we have kept the commentaries brief (except for the first Judan game, which is extremely complicated), but even so they should give a good picture of Cho's go at this stage of his career. One thing that hasn't changed is that Cho, in contrast to certain players who will remain nameless, likes to experiment; in particular, he dislikes playing the same fuseki, so he is always coming up with something new. His style is so flexible that it's hard to put a label on it, but he certainly prefers profit to thickness or large moyos. Like Sakata, he is known for his skill at shinogi, that is, at saving weak groups. This is a necessary skill if you go all out to take territory, as inevitably you have to leave weak groups to fend for themselves. Another characteristic of Cho's play is that he tends to split the game up into a number of small fights, which he is very skilful at coordinating. The more complicated the position is, the better he plays.

The 27th Judan Title

Cho took the Judan title from Kato last year, winning the title match 3–2 (unfortunately, we did not have room to give the series in *Go World*). This year the challenger was Rin Kaiho, who held the title once, back in 1975. Rin has been one of the dominant players of the last two and a half decades, ever since he burst on to the scene in 1965, winning the Meijin, then the top title, at the age of 23. In the 1980s, his main success has been winning the Honinbo title twice (1983 and 1984); apart from that, he has made unsuccessful challenges for the Kisei (1980, 1982 and 1984), Meijin (1987), and Oza (1986) titles, but he remains a force to be reckoned with, as his achievement in reaching the Fujitsu Cup final twice in a row demonstrates. In his youth, Rin was a territorial player, who relied on positional judgement and accurate calculation of the score as his main weapons. When Ishida Yoshio came along and stripped him of his titles through a great mastery of those same weapons, Rin completely overhauled his game and turned into an aggressive fighter.

Honours were even in previous title matches between these two, with Rin having taken the Honinbo title from Cho in 1983 (he lost the first three games, then won the next four) and Cho having rebuffed Rin's challenge for the 1984 Kisei title 4–2. The Judan title match between these two was a tumultuous one, with each game featuring heavy fighting. Cho came out the victor by 3–0, but he himself admitted that he was saved by slips his opponent made late in the middle game.

Game One

White: Cho Chikun Honinbo, Judan & Tengen

Black: Rin Kaiho 9-dan

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 5 hours each.

Played on 3 March 1989 on Ishigaki Island, Okinawa. *Commentary by Abe 9-dan and Kato 9-dan.*

Figure 1 (1–51). *Immediate complications*

The character of the opening is decided by Rin's bold move at 13, which leads to a complicated fight when White cuts almost immediately.

White 14 is connected with a ladder, though it will not itself be a ladder block. The ladder comes up with 19. If Black plays instead at 1 in *Dia. 1*, White may counter with 2 and 4. The lad-

der after 7 is favourable for Black (14 in the figure doesn't break it), but then White will play 'a' in the figure as his ladder break. Black has to capture, so next White can push through at 'b'. Rin didn't like the idea of this, so he connected at 19.





Figure 1 (1-51)




Dia. 1

Black 23. Permitting White 24 is painful, so Black could have considered playing peacefully as in *Dia. 2*.


Black 27. Rin regretted not pushing up at 'c' instead.

White 30 is a very territorial move, typical of Cho, perhaps. According to Abe, eight or nine professionals out of ten would jump to 1 in *Dia. 3*. If then Black 2, White could defend the bottom with 3. When a centre fight is under way, taking control of the centre like this would seem to have top priority. Of course, White 30 does take away Black's base, so Black feels compelled to reinforce his position with 31 to 35. Even after that, however, one can see that 34 works in con-


cert with 30 to threaten Black's base. Instead of 31, Kato advocated attacking in the centre with Black 'd'.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

White 50. The usual move at 1 in *Dia. 4* is not good in this case. Black will play 2 and 4 in sente, then descend at 6.

Black 51 is a good move. Cho had expected to keep sente after 48, so he had planned to hane at 'e', which would have forced Black to move out by making an empty triangle at 'f'. Black 51 took him by surprise.





Figure 2 (52-100)




Dia. 5

Figure 2 (52-100). *Rin takes the lead.*

White 54 is bad, as it lets Black block off access to his moyo with 55. White should have extended solidly towards the centre with 1 in *Dia. 5*. If Black captures a stone with 2 and 4, White can make an excellent attack with 5. On the other hand, permitting White to extend into the corner with White 4 *after* White 1 would also be unbearable.

A player's skill can often be seen in the moves he doesn't play. Declining to push at 'a' with 57, a move most players would make automatically, is very clever. Black 'a' is tempting, as it would seal off this side of Black's moyo, but it would give White too much help, by provoking White 'b'. With good aji here, White could later jump to 'c', which would secure all the bottom area as white territory. Without the 'a-b' exchange —

Dia. 6. If White plays 1, Black can counter with 2 to 6, exposing defects in White's position. The Black 8-10 combination next will break open the bottom territory. With his weaknesses at 'a', 'b', and 'c', White can't cope with this fight.



Dia. 6


Black 57 and 59 are a severe attack, but White 60 aims at his weak point at 'd', so Black has to reinforce with 63. Up to 70, White succeeds in linking up his centre group.

Black 71 is a good move; if White tries to save his stone, he will just help Black to rope off the right side. Instead, White boldly invades at 72.

Cho was dissatisfied with the result to 88. Though White lives, he has been forced into a very low position. When Black switches to 89, he is leading.

Black 91. Better at 'e', for reasons that will become clear later.

Black 99. If at 1 in *Dia. 7*, White can attach at 2 and play a ko. However, White has too few threats to win it, so Black should have played this way. Perhaps Rin slacked off a little here, as he was aiming at the cut beginning with 31 in the next figure.



Dia. 7

White 100 is aggressive. The safe move would be to secure the centre with White 'f', Black 'g', White 'h', but Cho is going all out.

Incidentally, Cho went into byo-yomi on 94 and Rin on 97, just as the game became extremely complicated.

Figure 3 (101-144). *A kaleidoscopic change*

Black 1. When Black ignores White's peep, White gets his chance to throw the game into confusion. He is behind, so he has nothing to lose.

Black 11. If at 12, Black could have contained the damage more. When Black lives up to 15, White uses the contact play of 16 to save his group.





Figure 3 (101-144)

White 24. If at 'a', a large semeai between two eyeless groups would follow after Black 'b', White 25, but even if the players weren't in byo-yomi, working out the result of this fight would be very difficult. Cho decides to play safe with 24.


Black 27. Black has no choice. If he stopped White from linking up with Black 28, White would kill him after White 'c', Black 'a', White 'd'.

Rin attempts to take compensation for his loss on the top right by cutting off White's centre group with 29 and 31, the combination he has been aiming at for some time. The fate of this group will decide the game.

White 32 is the reason why Black should have made the solid connection instead of 91 in Figure 2, but White makes a mistake with 34. He should cut immediately with 1 in Dia. 8.




Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Dia. 8. If White 1, Black can't connect at 2, as White captures the stones below with 3 to 7. Therefore —

Dia. 9. Black has to answer at 2, letting White play 3 and 5. At this stage, with the area above still unsettled and with the defects in Black's formation, White will be able to live. Cho's mistake was that he thought he could play this sequence later.




Dia. 10



Dia. 11


Dia. 10. The counter White has to watch out for is the atari of 2, but at this stage he can use the 'fake' ladder of 9 etc. to link up.

White 42. Cho had planned to play 1 in Dia. 9 at this point, but he realized that Black now had the clever counter of 2 in *Dia. 11*. After the moves to 9, Black 2 is in just the right place to stop White from getting two eyes, so White collapses. Cho therefore switched to 42, but his group was theoretically dead. His salvation lay in the time pressure Rin was under.



Dia. 12

Black 43 was to gain time. Next, all Black has to do to kill White is to connect at 1 in *Dia. 12*. Without the squeeze of these two black stones, White can't hope to live. For example, White 2 etc. here only make one eye. Instead of 2 —



Dia. 13

Dia. 13. If White 2 here, Black counters with 3 and 5, and White will be unable to get two eyes. If Black had played 1, the game would have been over.





Figure 4 (145-166)

66: takes two stones (above 45)




Dia. 14

Figure 4 (145-166). *Rin lets Cho off the hook.*

Once White plays 46 and 48, his group is safe. At the same time he secures a win, thanks to the profit he took earlier on the top right. Even if Black connects at 49, that is, at 1 in *Dia. 14*, White uses the atari of 4 to capture two stones and make an extra eye.

Instead, Black attacks with 49, but White dis-

cards the tail of his group, living with 50 to 58. If instead he connected at 1 in *Dia. 15*, his group would die after Black 2.



Dia. 15

By capturing at 66, White also saves his stones in the top centre. Black could have captured them by cutting at A with 61, but 61 is bigger.

Rin's oversight meant that Cho's shinogi strategy succeeded, but actually the game should have been one of the rare examples of the failure of Cho's shinogi.

White has a comfortable lead even without the komi, but Rin struggles on for nearly 80 moves before he resigns.





Figure 5 (167-200)

Figure 5 (167-200), Figure 6 (201-242)

Black resigns after White 242.



Rin wastes his best chance of the series.




Figure 6 (201-242)
17: captures three stones;
25: connects; 32: connects

Game Two

White: Rin Kaiho

Black: Cho Chikun

Played at Iwamuro Hot Spring, Niigata Prefecture, on 24 March 1989.

Commentary by Ishida Akira 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)


Figure 1 (1-50). A quiet beginning

The players start slowly, as if digging in for protracted warfare. The first move deserving of comment is White 22, which is usually a simple extension to 24. The drawback of 22 is that it gives Black good, solid shape in the corner; the


reason White plays it is that his continuation at 26 serves to dissuade Black from invading at 'a'.

Black 27. If at 'a', White will cap at 28, which will be a severe attack. Black 27 sets up a good continuation at 'b', so White defends at 28, though he would also like to jump to 'c' at the bottom.

White 30 is correct shape. If Black plays 1 in *Dia 1*, White is ready with the counterpunch of 2 and 4.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Black 41. It's very unusual to see this endgame move played so early. Since White answers with 42 and 44, Black gains four points in sente. The opinion was expressed that White should have switched 44 to the right side, but Black would take 11 points in sente with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*.

Rin and Cho in the Big Three

As mentioned earlier, Rin holds the record, with 13 big-three titles to his credit, compared to 11 for Cho. These titles are as follows:

Rin: 4th to 6th, 8th, 10th to 12th Yomiuri Meijin titles; 2nd Asahi Meijin title; 23rd to 25th Honinbo titles; 38th, 39th Honinbo titles.

Cho: 7th to 9th Kisei titles; 5th to 9th Asahi Meijin titles; 36th, 37th, 44th Honinbo titles.

With his age advantage, we can surely expect to see Cho overhaul Rin and, what's more, in the not-too-distant future. Cho is unrivalled in his success rate for big-three titles: he has won 11 out of 14 best-of-seven title matches and has never failed to take the title when he was the challenger (four times so far). In contrast, Rin has lost 14 best-of-seven matches and has made seven unsuccessful challenges. There are two ways of interpreting these statistics. One is that by playing in nearly twice as many best-of-sevens as anyone else Rin has, in a sense, dominated the go scene. The other is that if you're the titleholder, whatever happens, you don't want to see Cho as the challenger!

More on title statistics over page.

Top Title Winners

If we broaden our scope to all more-or-less open tournaments, including the three new international tournaments (Ing, Fujitsu, and IBM) and the TV tournaments, we find that as of 31 October 1989 the most successful title winners were as listed below. Figures given in parentheses are the number of top-three titles.

1. Sakata Eio: 64 (9)
2. Otake Hideo: 39 (4)
3. Kato Masao: 31 (5)
4. Cho Chikun: 29 (11)
5. Kobayashi Koichi: 27 (7)
6. Rin Kaiho: 25 (13)
7. Ishida Yoshio: 23 (6)
8. Fujisawa Shuko: 21 (8)
9. Takagawa Shukaku: 18 (10)
10. Takemiya Masaki: 17 (6)
11. Hashimoto Uтарo: 12 (3)

In addition, Shimamura Toshihiro 9-dan has won 15 titles, including eight Crown titles, open only to Nagoya players, and Kobayashi Reiko, wife of Kobayashi Koichi, has won ten women's titles.

The above are all players who have won ten or more open titles. Readers familiar with go history, however, will realize that lists like the above are biased in favour of the younger players, since it is only in the last three decades that the number of titles has proliferated. (After the 1st Honinbo title was decided in 1941, it was not until 1951 that the second newspaper tournament was founded, with another following in 1954, though both of these were restricted to Nihon Ki-in members.) Also, two important titles from the 1950's that were discontinued are not included in tallies of major titles, though in their day they ranked on the same level at the current big three. They are the Saikoi (Top Position title) and the Saikyoi (Strongest Player title, the predecessor of the Meijin title). The biggest injustice of all is to disregard Go Seigen's 12 victories in jubangos (best-of-ten matches) — as far as establishing his dominance in the two decades from the late 30s to the early 50s, winning a jubango was like making a clean sweep of the top three titles nowadays. (The usual count is 11 jubangos, but we're including a 12th, called 'Go Seigen v. Top-Ranked Players', played against the top ten players just below those who rated individual jubangos against Go — he won this 8-1, with 1

jigo. He also played many other matches, almost all of which he won.)

Concerning the two 1950's titles mentioned above, the Saikoi lasted from 1955 to 1961 and was won three times by Sakata, twice by Kitani, and once by Shuko. The Saikyoi was even more short-lived, being held three times between 1958 and 1961, before giving way to the Meijin title. The 1st title was won by Go Seigen, the second by Sakata, and these two tied for 1st in the 3rd.

If we include these titles and the jubangos, then the complete list of winners of the five big titles plus Go Seigen's jubangos would go as follows:

1. Sakata, Go Seigen: 14
3. Rin: 13 4. Cho: 11 5. Takagawa: 10
6. Fujisawa Shuko: 9 7. Kobayashi Koichi: 7
8. Ishida Yoshio, Takemiya: 6
10. Kato Masao: 5
11. Otake Hideo: 4
12. Hashimoto Uтарo: 3
13. Iwamoto Kaoru, Kitani Minoru: 2
15. Sekiyama Riichi: 1

These 15 players, a surprisingly small number, have shared the glory in the 93 big titles + 12 jubangos that have been held to date. Any listing headed by Sakata and Go Seigen can't be too far out. From a contemporary standpoint, the most telling point is that no player now under 30 has won a big title (or any of the seven open titles, for that matter). Unlike the shogi world, where new young players are taking some of the top titles, the new generation in go has yet to make its mark.



Go Seigen (around 1948?)





Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). *The fortunes of war fluctuate.*


White 54 is a bewitching move: it shows the pliancy of the Rin Kaiho style. Usually you'd expect to see a kosumi at 67, but in this case Black 69 would work perfectly in keeping White out of this area. The game looks incredibly close. When White plays 54, it's strangely difficult for Black to guard his moyo, which is why he switches to 55.

Rin's counter is the wedge in at 56, the timing of which is perfect. Cho spent all of his remaining time on 57 and at this early stage was already down to his last minute of byo-yomi. [The ten minutes of byo-yomi remain constant as long as one plays within one minute, but every time one reaches 60 seconds, a minute is deducted.] The result to 64, in which White captures two stones, is clearly a gain for him. Instead of 57 —

Dia. 3. If Black answers at 1, his corner is whittled down considerably, while his outside group has bad aji, making this a bad result for Black.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4. The other possibility is Black 1 here, but there is a strong possibility that White will descend at 'a' later. One can't say that this result is superior to that in the figure.

White 70. If White pushed up at 72, he would maintain the lead he has just established. Rin probably made the snap judgement that Black would answer 70 at 1 in *Dia. 5*, in which case he could have parried with 4. It must have been a shock to him when Black started with the atari of 71. The game was level again when Black captured at 75. Instead of 74 —



Dia. 5



Dia. 6


Dia. 6. If White captures at 1 now, Black plays 2 and 4, causing a big reduction compared to *Dia. 5*.

Black 81. Black 'a' might be better.


White 84 and 86, defending against the threat of Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', are biggest.

By this time Rin was also down to his last minute of byo-yomi, so the rest of the game was played at a furious pace.

White 90 is the losing move: he suffers a big loss when Black uses the cut of 91 to devastate the right side. If White simply pulled back at 1 in *Dia. 7*, the game would probably be a half-pointer. White 1 here is apparently a little superior to White 'a'.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

A player of Rin's calibre should have no trouble finding a move like 1 in Dia. 7. Possibly the shock of giving Black the ponnuki at 75 had led him to be unduly pessimistic about his game, so he may have believed that he had to play aggressively instead of answering docilely. In Rin's own words: 'Recently I've become short-tempered.'

White 96. Even if White attacks with 1 and 3 in Dia. 8 (previous page), Black lives simply with 4, which must be upsetting for White.




Figure 3 (101-149)

9: connects (at 7); 42: ko (above 35); 47: ko (at 45)

Figure 3 (101-149). Adding insult to injury

After Black lives up to 19, White has to take gote to defend his own eye shape with 20. This is excruciating for White: not only has Black destroyed his territory, he's done it in sente.

White does his best to take a big centre, but when Black plays 43 and 45 there's nothing left to fight over. Black also wins the ko fight on the right side, so the gap becomes surprisingly wide. Because he was the first to put points on the board, White must have found this loss all the harder to bear.




Figure 4 (150-201)

64: connects



Cho listens intently to words of wisdom from Sakata Eio. Once again Rin short-circuited.

Figure 4 (150–201). *Another win, but . . .*

Cho seemed to take an iron lock on the series with this second successive win, but, as we have seen, the manner of his win was not completely convincing. There were not signs as yet that he was back in top form.

Black wins by 6 1/2 points.

(‘Kido’, May 1989)

Game Three

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Rin Kaiho

Played in Taipei on 6 April 1989.

Commentary by Sakata Eio.

For the third year in a row one of the Judan games was played in Taipei, which theoretically should have worked to the advantage of Rin Kaiho, who is a citizen of Taiwan (Rin was born in Shanghai, but his family moved to Taiwan when he was a child). The support of local fans was not enough to make a difference, though Rin certainly didn’t shirk his task. This game was one furious fight from beginning to end.





Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 1 (1–50). *Plunging at once into a fight*

Pressing immediately at 8 is a little unusual. Sakata: ‘Chikun tries all kinds of different things in the opening.’

Cho’s further decision to push along immediately with 12 and 14 is another sign of his very positive approach in this game. Rin responds with similar fighting spirit by making the hane at 17. If he simply extended at 24, White would push along with 17 and ‘a’, then attach

beneath 5. Black can’t let himself be pushed around like this, though his play lets White create aji with the forcing moves of 18 to 24.



Dia. 1: thickness superior?

Black 23. Ignoring White 22 in favour of the atari at 1 in *Dia. 1* is conceivable. The result is a trade of profit for thickness. The exact evaluation of this result would differ with the player, but there’s no way it could be considered bad for Black.

Black 29, looking to play ‘b’ next, is a good move. Jumping to 32 instead or capturing White 24 with an atari to its left would lessen the pressure on White.

Black 31 lets White attack at the vital point of 32. Counterattacking with 39 is natural, but White has a clever counter with 40 to 44. An unpredictable fight follows.

Cho on his style

My go doesn’t have any particular pattern or style. The way I play varies in each individual position and in each game. I never have a predetermined strategy.

The late Takagawa, Fujisawa Shuko, Otake — each has his characteristic style. The same, of course, is true of Takemiya. Following a set style doesn’t suit me. Go Seigen had no set style. Neither does Sakata. So when I play through the games of these two, I really feel an affinity with them.

My game consists of bringing everything together without using set patterns of play. This absence of style is my style. If I try to follow a conscious pattern in a game, things always go wrong. Self-consciousness makes my stones develop awkwardly.

I do well when I play freely and uninhibitedly and everything comes together naturally, or at least without my consciously trying to coordinate everything.

I try to experiment in the openings, without following set fuseki patterns. My failing is that I tend to make extensions that are too wide, so I try to restrain myself.





Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). *One fight follows another.*

The fight comes to a peaceful end when both sides live at the bottom up to 65, but the third round promptly gets under way with 66.

Black 71. If Black connects at 76, White will pull back to the right of 70 and make a severe attack on the whole group.

White 82. White could capture six stones with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 2*, but Cho must feel that this is too small. Nonetheless, this would be a reasonable result, as White gets sente to play 'a' at the top.



Dia. 2: too small?

Figure 3 (101-150). *Rin is caught napping.*

Black's problems begin with 9. Safer would be extending solidly at 1 in *Dia. 3*. After forcing White to defend at 2, Black could switch to 3. If White pushes up with 4 and 6, Black lives neatly with 5 and 7. If instead of 6, White plays 'a', then Black links up after Black 7, White 'b', Black 'c'.

White 12 and 14 catch Rin napping: his atari at 15 loses the game. Instead, Black must play at

1 in *Dia. 4*; if White 2, Black links up safely with 3. White's capture of two stones with 4 is nothing special; later Black can live in the corner with Black 'a' through 'e'.






Figure 3 (101-150)




Dia. 3: better aji



Dia. 4: correct for 15

After White 16 to 20, Black can't rescue his 11 stones. If he does connect at 1 in *Dia. 5*, White catches the whole group with 2 to 6. Rin's oversight ruined what had been a good game for him.



Dia. 5: complete disaster

When White switches to 30, he has a sure win.




Figure 4 (151-204)

Figure 4 (151-204). *Cho's greater precision in byo-yomi*

White 66. Blocking at 73 is a little bigger.

At the end White cuts off a black group at the top, but he is already ahead.

White 94 and 96 demonstrate the precision of Cho's play even when under time pressure. Later White can play 'a' and pick up two stones.

Black 101 is a slip: it should be at 'b'; White would have to play 'c', whereupon Black 101 would work, as White wouldn't be able to cut at 102 because of shortage of liberties. Even with correct play, though, White would still be way behind.

In the first game Rin missed a chance to crush a group in the centre; in the second game he declined to defend solidly because of a misreading of the overall position; in this game he slipped up in the defence of a big centre group of his own. All these mistakes occurred late in the

middle game, so Rin's erratic play in byo-yomi seems to have played a major role in deciding the outcome of the series. Cho's play in byo-yomi proved to be more reliable.

Black resigns after White 204.

(*'Kido'*, June 1989)



趙治勲十段

Magazine commentaries can be misleading: in their insistence on finding a move that can be blamed for losing a game, they may give the impression that but for one slip in this game and another slip in that game a whole series could have gone the other way. What a commentary cannot convey is the tremendous pressure under which the players are playing, even when there is no shortage of time (not to mention the fact that the handful of variations given in explanatory diagrams are only the tip of the iceberg). It is this pressure, the pressure of searching desperately for a way to outplay a rival who certainly knows as much about the game as one does oneself, that leads top professionals to make wrong decisions in tense situations. It's also easy to criticize the play when the result is already known and the players have confessed their errors.

Our commentaries have focussed on Rin's mistakes, but Cho's good play has to be read between the lines. He bore the brunt of Rin's aggression, absorbed the full force of his blows, and returned them with interest. When the fighting became most fierce, he was the cooler and more accurate of the two. He deserved to defend his title.

The first time Cho won the Judan title, in 1982, he let go of it the following year. This time he has shown greater tenacity. The closest anyone has come to establishing a Judan dynasty is Kato, who held it for four years in a row from 1976 to 1979, so the record Cho has to shoot for is a relatively modest one. With two in a row, he's made the right start.

Also, one should not overlook the fact that these all-out struggles with Rin made Cho fighting fit just in time for the Honinbo title match.

The 44th Honinbo Title



The rivals, in a rural setting during the title series. Unlike Takemiya and Kobayashi, these two are on speaking terms, so photographers don't have to work so hard to get them to pose together.

The 44th Honinbo league was one of the toughest recently, with four players in strong contention for the challengership. Cho started with two wins and never dropped out of a tie for the lead, but he ended up losing two games, so Otake, last year's challenger, who lost two of his first three games, ended up in a tie for first place. In addition, Kobayashi Koichi was also in the running until the 6th round, when he lost to Hane. A more serious threat was posed by Kataoka, who went into the last round with the same 4-2 score as Cho. These two were drawn against each other, and a week earlier Otake had played and won his final game against Hane, so that meant that the winner would earn a place in the league playoff. (The league chart is given in GW55.)

The finale to the league, played on 20 April, was suitably dramatic, with Cho scraping by by just half a point against the unlucky Kataoka, a

two-time Tengen title winner who has yet to challenge for a big title.

The next obstacle awaiting Cho was the league playoff against Otake, who had defeated him in their league encounter in the fourth round. However, the playoff (24 April) was a different story: Cho took an early lead and had no trouble hanging on to it. After three years away from the front line, Cho was finally to make his reappearance as a contender for a big title.

Big things were expected of the encounter between Takemiya and Cho. The two have met twice before in major title matches. The first was the 1981 Honinbo title match, when Cho took the title from Takemiya 4-2 (see GW25 & 26). The other was the 1985 Kisei title match, when Cho just managed to hold off Takemiya's challenge 4-3 (GW40). The former match started with Cho winning three straight, so it lacked drama, even though Takemiya redeemed his honour a little by delaying Cho's win for two games. That victory made Cho the youngest Meijin-Honinbo in tournament history. The latter, however, was one of the most exciting matches of the 80s, for it was one of the rare matches in which *both* players were at their best. Consequently, go fans were treated to a frontal clash between the two most contrasting styles of playing the game: territory v. moyo. Not only that, the series was a seesaw one and was actually the last Kisei title to go the full distance.

We wish that we could say that fans were in for a similar treat in this issue, but unfortunately Takemiya was in no better form than in this year's Kisei match. In 1985 Takemiya's play radiated boldness and self-confidence; this year he seems diffident and self-doubting, despite his Fujitsu successes.

In contrast, Cho had worked himself into form during the Judan title match and was playing more and more like his old self. Also, not having done conspicuously well in the new international tournaments so far, he was staking everything on the newspaper tournaments. He is the first and only player to win all seven of the open titles — referred to in the go press in Japan as 'the grand slam of go'. (A real grand slam, winning all seven in the same year, seems out of the question, in view of the mental and physical burdens title-match play imposes on the participants.)

Game One

White: Takemiya Masaki Honinbo

Black: Cho Chikun Judan & Tengen

Komi: 5 1/2; time: 8 hours each.

Played in Madrid on 12, 13 May 1989.

Commentary by Takagi Shoichi 9-dan.

At Takemiya's urging, the first game of this year's Honinbo title match was held in Spain, which Takemiya calls his favourite country. The party, which included the 86-year-old Iwamoto 9-dan as referee and Yamashiro Hiroshi 9-dan as commentator for the Mainichi, received a warm welcome, including an audience with the King of Spain, Juan Carlos (see back cover). Go seems to be enjoying a boom in Madrid, and there were many local fans in attendance to follow the game. Both Takemiya and Iwamoto participated in teaching sessions held the day after the game and Takemiya gave a commentary on the game, something that the player who lost is not usually eager to do.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). *Ideal shape — and an overplay*

[Takemiya's first move is in Black's bottom right corner. Readers may remember the adverse comment aroused when Kobayashi Koichi played in this corner against Takemiya (GW56, page 38), but no one commented on Takemiya's move here.]

Black 11 is handicap-go style, but Cho often tries it. Since he has strength in the top right and bottom left corners, he wants to start a fight in his

sphere of influence.

Black 19 works with 11 and 17 to attack the corner white group, so moving out from the bottom with White 'a' would have been preferable to 18. Black gets superb shape at the bottom with 21 and 23.

White 24 is the inimitable Takemiya touch. He was probably happy to see Black link up along the side with the inelegant sequence from 27 to 33. For his part, Cho considered this adequate, because he had profited at the bottom. His judgement was correct.

White 34 is an interesting move; there was just one player who predicted it: Iwamoto 9-dan. The conventional move of White 'b' would give Black a good move at 47.

Black 43 is the all-out kind of move Cho favours, but it may be an overplay. Exchanging Black 48 for White 43, then defending the corner with Black 'c' would be good enough.

Black 47 is a sharp move, but ...




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). *The decisive invasion*


White is happy when he cuts at 54: he is back in the game.

White 60 is a good move. When it comes to the insight required to find moves like this, Takemiya is in a class of his own. If Black slides into the corner at 95 in response, White will probably ignore him and push down at 74.

Black 69. Perhaps better to connect at 73 immediately.

White goes too far with 76. Instead, he should hold back at 1 in *Dia. 1* (next page). If Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White dodges to 'd' and

should be able to kill the intruder. Black's invasion at 77 starts the decisive fight of the game.



Dia. 1: the right extension

Black 95 is a clever move. If instead Black made a hane at 96, he would be in trouble after White blocked at 95.

White 100. For better or for worse, White has to block at 'b' and fight the ko. He has a lot of ko threats — for example, 'c' and 'd' on the right. Black would have to use moves attempting to escape to the outside as his ko threats. His success or failure would decide the game.




Figure 3 (101-144)

Figure 3 (101-144). *A crucial mistake in timing*


The result to 7 is a success for Black. One suspects that Takemiya made a misreading at some stage of this fight.

White 10. Better to play at 17 and aim at attacking at 11 later.


Black 21 to 25 are clever moves, but Black 27 should be at 29, as then White 28 wouldn't be sente.

White 36. Cutting here is the final losing move. White should attach immediately at 38, that is, 1 in *Dia. 2*. The same sequence as in the game would follow with 2 to 7. After this, instead of cutting at 'a', White will descend at 'b', forcing

Black to add a lot of stones to remove these two stones from the board. That would make a difference of about five points, so the game would still be close.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Note that Black cannot block at 2 in *Dia. 3*. He collapses after White 3 to 13. If Black switches 4 to 12, the corner falls after White 7, Black 8, White 10, Black 'a', White 'b'.




Figure 4 (145-200)

Figure 4 (145-200). *Conflicting moyos*

White may be thick in the centre, but his Achilles' heel is exposed when Black plays 47: White's top-right and bottom-left moyos are fighting with each other (if he tries to surround one, it hurts the other).

Figure 5 (201-229). *First blood to Cho*

When White resigns, he is about 12 points behind on the board. Going by his opening, Black

should have been able to win this game comfortably, but along the way he fumbled. Despite his win, Cho's lack of stability is worrying.

White resigns after Black 229.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 52 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 50 minutes.

('Kido', July 1989)




Figure 5 (201-229)

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun

Black: Takemiya Masaki

Played at Yunoyama Hot Spring in Mie Prefecture on 29, 30 May 1989.

Commentary by Kobayashi Koichi.




Figure 1 (1-50)

40: ko

Figure 1 (1-50). Cho's innovation

I don't like Black 9. Takemiya probably agonized over this move, but one naturally expects him to play the cosmic style with 'a'. He knows only too well that however much territory he surrounds, Cho is going to parachute inside, but still I think the opponent will be happy to see Takemiya abandon his patented style. The cosmic style is after all the most frightening.


White promptly invades at 18. This may seem too early, but it shows how primed up Cho was for the game. White can be satisfied with the result to 25, as Black's position in the bottom right is a little narrow.

White 26. A Cho innovation that will probably be adopted by other players. In contrast to the established moves of 34 and 'b', 26 keeps sente. The question is how effectively Black can use the thickness he builds up to 35.

White 36 and 38 show natural fighting spirit, but Black 39 is a skilful counterattack. Submissively connecting the ko (with 39 at 32) would be unprofessional.

White 40. If White attaches at 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black has a clever counter with 2 to 6, capturing the three white stones to the right. This diagram shows why 39 is such a good move.

Black 41 aims at a squeeze, but White switches to 42, forestalling a black invasion at 'c'. The players leave the ko for later.



Dia. 1






Figure 2 (51-82)





Figure 3 (83-100)



Dia. 2


Figure 2 (51-82). *The difference of one line*

White 54, alleviating the severity of the coming squeeze, is a good move.

Black 57. Black should first exchange Black 60 for White 'a'. If White omitted 'a', Black would get a ko, as shown in *Dia. 2*.

White 66 is a move Cho bitterly regretted. Instead, White should play 'b', forcing Black 67, as then he could advance further with White 'c' next. That way Black wouldn't be able to counterattack with 77, a move which makes good use of his centre thickness. White 66 is Cho's only bad move of the game.

White 82 is an all-out move. Prudence would seem to call for a reinforcement in the centre at White 'd', but then Black 82 would be enormous. White 'e', Black 'f', White 'g' follow, representing a gain for Black of 17 points compared to the figure. Accepting this loss would be unbearable for Cho: he prefers to let Black attack his centre group. For better or for worse, Cho plays his own game.



Dia. 3: *Black must attack*

Figure 3 (83-100). *Deserting the battle front*

Black 93 and 95 are the losing moves. There is no need for White to answer 95, so he secures his centre group with 96. Takemiya, of course, had to continue his attack with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*. The continuation to 9 could be expected; White doesn't get even one eye, so he's in trouble. If next White 'a', Black could attach at 'b', aiming to engineer a double attack; if then White 'c', Black plays 'd'. Black doesn't have to kill White; if he just takes some profit by attacking, he'll have a chance of winning.

Figure 4 (101-150). *All under control*

The issue has already been settled. It's marvellous how Cho has it all read out: his centre group seems so precarious, yet after 14 it has a safe two eyes.




Figure 4 (101-150)
12: connects




Figure 5 (151-210)

Figure 5 (151-210). Two up

Takemiya's misconceived diversionary attack in Figure 3 cost him any chance of winning, but what stands out in this game is the controlled aggression of Cho's play.

Black resigns after White 210.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 59 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 59 minutes.

('Kido', August 1989)



Game Three

White: Takemiya Masaki

Black: Cho Chikun

Played on 7, 8 June in Kobe City.

Commentary by Otake Hideo.





Figure 1 (1-49)

Figure 1 (1-49). The problem of the ladder block

White 8. Takemiya doesn't often play this large-scale joseki. Usually you'd expect to see him jump to 11.


Black 33. Black is aiming at a ladder with Black 47. If he plays the more peaceful ladder-maker of 1 in *Dia. 1*, White will just capture with 2 and 4, and the result may be a little slack for Black.



Dia. 1: White is happy


Resisting with 34 seems dubious. I would settle the problem of the ladder with 1 in *Dia. 2*. If

Black 2, White 3 is a stylish answer. The shape to 9 is one you see in a certain joseki — that's right, the one when White enters the corner at 3 under the marked black stone. If Black 10, the fight after 11 to 17 looks reasonable for White. White's answering a move like 33 just makes the opponent happy.




Dia. 2: satisfactory for White

I think there is a psychological factor in Takemiya's choosing to answer with 34. There are two ways of eliminating the ladder on the bottom right, and he probably had a very hard time trying to choose between them. The other way is shown in *Dia. 3*.



Dia. 3: the alternative



Dia. 4: reasonable


White 38 is an obstinate move. This is one point at which White could eliminate the ladder. The moves to 6 in *Dia. 4* would probably follow.

Figure 2 (50-77). A fatal injury


I don't understand why White played 50 and 52. As indicated before, pushing up with 1 to 5 in *Dia. 5* looks most reasonable. If next Black 'a', a fight follows after White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd'. One might mention that the marked stone in the bottom left corner is in a fantastic position: it holds in check equally the influence of Black's thickness on the top left and to the right. In particular, White can look forward to threatening

the seven black stones at the bottom by extending to 'e'. If Black later plays at 'a' in the figure and White squeezes with 'b' through 'd', then his stone at 50 will become redundant.

In any case, after the result on the top left, with White being confined on the inside, the game was no longer one in which Takemiya had any chance of playing his favourite large-moyo strategy. I'm not saying that Black was ahead, just that Takemiya was probably irritated with his game.




*Figure 2 (50-77)
74: connects*




Dia. 5: a superior strategy


The L-shape connection of 59 makes tremendous thickness. Black 61 and 63 next are a severe combination. If White carelessly ataris at 1 in *Dia. 6*, Black counters with 2; whether White plays 'a' or 'b' next, he can't connect his three stones after Black 'c'.




Dia. 6: disaster



Dia. 7: bad for White



Dia. 8: correct for 68



Dia. 9: a better ko

White 66. Moving out with 1 in *Dia. 7* would be bad. Black splits White into two with 2 and 4.

White 68 is an oversight: it could be called the losing move. Letting Black block at 75 in sente is terrible. White had to follow *Dia. 8*, which would have given an even game.




Figure 3 (78-122)
87: connects

Figure 3 (78-122). An elementary blunder

Pulling out 83 just after White has played 82 seems overly aggressive, but it turns out to be perfectly timed.

White 90. White A would be more solid, but then Black would go way ahead in territory by

blocking at 111 in sente, then enclosing territory with Black 94.

White 114 is an unbelievable blunder. It fills in one of White's own liberties and turns the approach-move ko (for Black) into a direct ko. Even after Black 'a' in *Dia. 9*, which shows the correct way to play here, Black would have to add another stone to get a direct ko.

This makes White's deficit irretrievable.




Figure 4 (123-221)
28: ko; 75: at 55; 76: takes;
106: connects (at 55); 110: ko

Figure 4 (123-221). The devil's hour

Takemiya's losing the series straight surprised me. I think that there must have been something wrong with his biorhythm. Perhaps the title of Honorary Honinbo that was at stake put him under heavy pressure, pressure that he could hardly refer to. He could probably have played in more relaxed fashion if he'd just been aiming at five successive titles without any honorary title involved.

In each game Takemiya seemed to be afflicted with a period of mental blankness in which blunders occurred: the so-called 'devil's hour' [the term professionals sometimes use to refer to the periods of fatigue during a game when blunders are likely to appear]. Everyone suffers from these mental blanks, but in this series Takemiya was unable to conquer them. Or perhaps it may be more correct to say that Cho forced these 'blanks' upon him. That's part of a player's power.

I think that the crucial game of this series was



Cho takes a commanding three-game lead

the second. In particular, Black 57 in Figure 2 (page 24), a move which revealed a preoccupation with territory, might well be the move Takemiya regrets the most in the whole series. The moment I saw that move I knew there was something wrong with him.

Takemiya plays an inimitable, highly individual game, one, moreover, with which it's difficult to achieve a high winning rate, but for that very reason I hope to see him revert to his winning ways.

White resigns after Black 221.

Time taken. White: 6 hours 4 minutes.

Black: 7 hours 59 minutes.

('Kido', August 1989)

Game Four

Black: Takemiya Masaki

White: Cho Chikun

Played in Hita City, Oita Prefecture, on 15, 16 June 1989. *Commentary by Cho.*

Figure 1 (1–44). *The difference between the critic and the player*

Black 17 shows the flexibility of Takemiya's




Figure 1 (1–44)

cosmic style: he doesn't just expand his moyo. I have serious second thoughts about my answer at 18. Black is launching a dual strategy with 19 and 21: moyo and territory. Because I made the high answer at 18, I gave Black a good move at 'a', so White can't claim to be ahead on territory. In contrast, Black can stake his game on territory or

on a moyo, as he chooses. White 18 is the reason why White has a hard time in this game.


I should have played 18 at 'b'; that would make it difficult for Black to slide into the corner at 19, so he would probably take up position at 'c'. That makes Black give up his territory option and forces him to concentrate on his moyo.

If I do something ordinary with 22, Black invades at 'a' and I can't win; if I reinforce at 'd', I can't win. Believing this, as I did, psychologically the only option left is to invade.

I was criticized for invading an area already open at the side (because of 16) and linking up in lowly fashion with 30. This is a penetrating opinion, and I can see the point of it, but it's no more than an abstract criticism. The only thing is that I should have omitted the 28-29 exchange, as this hurts me later when I invade at 34.

White 34 was intended as a probe; I didn't intend to keep playing here. My biggest worry was that Black would ignore 34 in favour of enclosing his moyo with a move like 'e'.

Black 37. Even now tenuki in order to play 'e' is conceivable; extending at White 37 would not be so big, especially when White has made the 28-29 exchange. I was grateful when Takemiya dutifully answered every move I made in this corner. His play here may be a sign of his general bad form in the series.



Dia. 1

White 44. White could avoid a ko with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 1*, but this result makes Black extremely thick. If he switched to 4 next, the game would probably be bad for White.

A big ko fight follows.





Figure 2 (45-78)

ko: 50, 53, 56, 59, 62, 65




Dia. 2

Figure 2 (45-78). *Another one of my slack moves*

The ko fight end with White discarding the corner and taking successive moves at 66 and 68 in its place. I think you can say the result is equal, but there are problems with the ko threats along the way. White 48 and 54 and then White 60 lose a little. On the other hand, Black 51, 57, and 63 are a minus for him. Actually, at the time I didn't expect Black to play this sequence as far as 63. The reason is that instead of 63 Black 'a' would also be sente [to the right] and would make White quite thin at the top [to the left]. White's gain from Black's simply playing 63 is invisible to the eye, but it's surprisingly big. Comparing the losses suffered by both sides from their ko threats, Black's may be slightly larger. At this point I felt I had made up some of the ground I

had lost in the opening.


With 69 Takemiya makes an atypically hard-headed reduction of my moyo. Even if White invades at 77 instead of 72, Black should be able to settle himself with the contact play at 'b', so the sequence to 77 looks reasonable. However, my next move, 78, is slack, even by my standards. White is aiming next at the sente move at 'c', but he must go in deeper, that is, at 1 in *Dia. 2* (previous page). White 7 will still be sente. Above all else, the difference of one line in cutting a moyo down to size is enormous. If White then defends the bottom left corner with 9 (after which Black can't invade), the lead would probably switch to White's hands. Note that securing the corner with a knight's move, not a diagonal move, is important. Instead of 2 –




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. If Black 2, White will pressure the black group at the top with 3. White can't afford to let this happen.

Whether White should play 78 immediately at 3 in *Dia. 3* is not clear. In any case, the slack move of 78 has handed the lead back to Black.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Figure 3 (79–121). Another mental blank

White 88. As stated above, this is slack. White can go as far as 1 in *Dia. 4*. Black 2 gives White an excellent continuation with 3 and 5, so Black will probably jump to 5 instead.





Figure 3 (79–121)



Dia. 6: Black stays ahead

White 90 is important. If Black captures with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 5*, then he can easily live in the corner with Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', yet having to add another white stone would be too painful.

White 92–98. An attack White has been aiming at for a while. Black can hardly pull back at 97 with 95, so White can't resist the impulse to attack here. Black 99 is the only move.

Play proceeds without problems for a while. Looking back dispassionately on the result to 109, I can see that it is almost even.

The saving grace for White is that when he plays 110, the black groups are involved in a fratricidal fight (*kyodai-genka*: if Black tries to surround one moyo, he will hurt the other). Even so, I felt that I was a little behind.

Suddenly Black plays the losing move. Black

119 — this is a light forcing move, making a casual enquiry of the opponent, but it's not sente. It's a blunder by Takemiya, or rather his mind must have gone blank for a moment. If he had defended at 1 in *Dia. 6*, he would have kept a small lead. If White 'a', Black just answers at 'b' and there are no problems. [Presumably Black can afford to sacrifice the two stones on the right here.]




Figure 4 (122-178)


Figure 4 (122-178). *Black's main territory is destroyed.*

The strong moves of 22 and 24 give White a good game at one stroke. White has been aiming at these moves for some time, which is why Black 1 in *Dia. 6* was necessary.

The cutting stone can't be captured. If Black can't capture it, he suffers terrible damage to his

territory, so the game is over.

If Black pushes along at 'a' instead of 27, all White has to do is to extend at 39. If Black plays 29 at 1 in *Dia. 7*, White slips out with 2 to 8. If Black 9 at 'a', White 'b'. How can White lose, when an earlier forcing move (the marked stone) ends up working so beautifully?



Dia. 7

Black rescues his group with 31 and 33, but in the meantime White cleverly links up on the first line.

The rest of the moves have no bearing on the result. I was saved by Takemiya's bad form; from the start of this game White was the one in trouble most of the time. I still have regrets about my uncharacteristic — or rather I should say characteristic — slack moves at 78 in Figure 2 and 88 in Figure 3.

Black resigns after White 178.

Time taken. White: 7 hours 53 minutes.

Black: 5 hours 16 minutes.

('Kido', August 1989. Cho report translated by John Power.)

Go Topics, Go Trivia

This new column is a collection of go trivia, items that don't fit into the news section but that may be of interest to our readers. To inaugurate the column we have quite a mixture: just how newsworthy or how trivial we leave it to the reader to judge.

Shuko to Exhibit Calligraphy

Fujisawa Shuko, Honorary Kisei, plans to hold an exhibition of his calligraphy in a Ginza department store (Japanese department stores all

have art galleries on the top floor) in June 1990. Shuko has always been noted not only for his calligraphy but also for his interest in classical Chinese literature, and he is a disciple of Yanagida Taiun, one of Japan's most celebrated calligraphers.

Below is an example of Shuko's bold, masculine style. The four-character text reads, 'shis-sui no kokorozashi', a direct translation of which goes 'knee-awl determination'. This is a quotation from a classical anecdote about a child who was

so determined not to flag at his study that he held an awl in his hand; whenever he felt sleepy, he would stab his knee with it to make himself alert again. This is one of Shuko's favourite quotations. He studied very hard when he was young, and he often chides young professionals whom he suspects of not emulating him.



British Go Songs

Go players who have attended European Go Congresses will have fond memories of the beer-drinking parties enlivened by the British contingent's singing of go songs. These are mainly popular tunes that have been fitted out with new sets of lyrics celebrating epic misadventures on the go board or describing typical foibles of amateur players. Well, T. Mark Hall has gone to the trouble of preserving these songs for posterity and his efforts have resulted in *The Official British Go Association Song Book*, available from the BGA Bookseller (Bob Bagot, 54 Massey Brook Lane, Lymn, Cheshire WA13 0PH, U.K.) for £2 a copy (discounts for bulk orders). The book also includes proverbs, ballads and tales, and we recommend it to anyone who likes to play go, drink beer and sing. If you want go songs created for your own go occasions, all you have to do is invite Francis Roads, the leading composer, to attend.

The Absent-Minded Kisei

Kobayashi Koichi is known for his habit of looking at the game record during a game. The more tense the game becomes, the more often he reaches out for the record. Some game recorders, who have got used to this habit of his, prepare an extra copy of the record for his sole use (the game recorder usually makes several

copies of a game, except when play is moving too fast, in byo-yomi, for example). Apparently Kobayashi gets a different perspective on the position by looking at the record (which sometimes of course is from the point of view of his opponent) and this helps him to make up his mind. Takemiya once objected to this practice, but it's not against the rules, so he didn't get anywhere.

Reaching out for the record seems to have become a kind of reflex action for Kobayashi. During one game in last year's Kisei title match, Kobayashi was alternatively taking sips of tea and looking at the record. One time Aizawa 2-dan, the recorder, was surprised to see that the hand reaching out for the record was still holding his tea cup. It took a bit of juggling on her part to remove the cup and give him the record.

What's Wrong with Kato?

Kato Masao, one of the giants of the go world, is still in the depths of an alarming slump. Last year he had a minus record — 23 wins to 24 losses — for the first time in his career, he lost three title matches (Meijin, Judan, and Gosei) and was lucky to win the Oza (Takemiya was demoralized after forfeiting the first game, which he was winning, when he made an illegal move). He also got eliminated early in the two new international tournaments, losing in the second rounds of the 1st Fujitsu and the 1st Ing Cups.

This year he is doing little better. His record to mid-November is once again a minus one, 18 wins to 23 losses, he lost his first game in the Fujitsu Cup, he lost his place in the Honinbo league and just barely avoided demotion from the Meijin league. In the Oza title match, he tied the score with the challenger, Hane 9-dan, by winning the second game, so he still has a chance of defending his last title, but apart from this he can't seem to do a thing right.

Perhaps the constant pressure of top tournament play, together with the numerous off-the-board social commitments that are the downside of being a title holder, have taken their toll on Kato. The problem is that there's no opportunity for a go player to take a long period off for rest and mental recuperation. Kato himself has said that he'd like a routine of two years on and one year off. Sakata tried this several years ago, semi-retiring for the best part of a year, and came back reinvigorated and playing better, but taking time off might not be so easy for a younger player — and impossible as long as he still has one title.

In Search of Harmony

An Interview with Ronald Schlemper

by Jonathan Wood



I spoke with Ronald Schlemper, Dutch 6-dan, the day after his first-round loss in the 1989 Fujitsu cup to Qian Yuping, Chinese 9-dan (see GW55 for the game). In fluent English he recounted his experiences with go and what it means to him. The following is an abridged transcript of our conversation.

Go World: Could you give me some information about your background?

Ronald: I was born the 26th of January, 1961. When I was six or so, my father read about go in the newspaper. My father is a fanatic about all kinds of board games, so he bought a go set and he tried to learn it by playing with a friend of his. My father's a physician, by the way.

At that time there were already some go clubs in Holland. It was in the '60s, so there must have been go clubs in Amsterdam, Leiden, The Hague. But he didn't know about them. So he just learned by himself and with his friend. But then, unfortunately, or well, fortunately for me later on, that friend moved to the east of Holland, so my father didn't have any opponent to play with.

He was already a very strong chess player, but

when he learned about go, he didn't touch the chessboard anymore and completely switched over to go. So you can imagine that when he lost his only opponent, he was at quite a loss about whom to play with. Then he thought about teaching his children. He has three sons; I'm the middle. My older brother was strong at resisting his attempts to play go and my younger brother was still quite young. I was about eight or nine, so I became the victim.

At the beginning I didn't like go at all, not because of the game, but because of my father. He always wanted to play. Of course, I liked other things, table tennis and so on. When I asked to play a game of table tennis, my father said, 'Well, first a game of go and then a game of table tennis.'

GW: How long did it take you to get stronger?

RS: The first two or three years, until I became 2-dan, I just went with my father to a local go club. I was 12 or so. I went to a lot of tournaments because my father went there, but I still didn't like go.

But then another colleague, Dr. Kimura, from Fukuoka, visited our home and he saw there was a go board. He was an amateur 5-dan or so, so he played a game with my father and my father said I could play as well. I played another man, Dr. Takayama, who was only 2- or 3-kyu, not so strong, so it was only natural that I won the game. But as Japanese custom requires, Dr. Kimura spoke flatteringly about my go as a way of expressing his good feelings. He said things like 'Your son has a lot of good talent. Actually it would be better if he came to Japan to study go. If he comes, he would be welcome to stay at my home.'

But my father wasn't accustomed to such expressions of hospitality. He thought it was in earnest. So he told the president of the Dutch Go Association that he had a son who was very talented at go and if he didn't go to Japan it would be a loss for the future. That was not Mr. Kimura's intention, he was just being polite. But the Japanese Go Association, the Nihon Ki-in, found out. Then Iwamoto, who's always very interested in spreading go, ordered one of his dis-

ciples, Mr. Sato, to take care of this 13-year-old Dutch boy.

GW: So you came to Japan at 13.

RS: Yes, I stayed for three months, two with Mr. Sato and one with Dr. Kimura.

I was interested in many things, so I liked having the opportunity to see such an interesting country as Japan, but I was still not so interested in go. But when I came to Japan, I discovered a completely different game of go than I knew in Holland.

GW: How was it different?

RS: It was played very differently, the same as the people are different. Maybe you don't agree, but it is characteristic of Eastern culture to try to find the middle way. There's a Japanese proverb that the nail which sticks out gets hammered down. There's an attitude of not going to the extreme of anything, while in Western society, it's the most important thing, what democracy is based on.

GW: To do what you think, to debate and so on.

RS: Yes, and because there are extreme opinions, that's why democracy works. So go is played in the same way. For example, if a go player is a little bit aggressive from a Western viewpoint, actually he is extremely aggressive, and is trying to kill groups all the time. He doesn't care about winning by 20 points, he only likes it if he kills an opponent's group.

So Western players are quite aggressive and very impatient. Patience is another characteristic of Japanese people.

GW: I've played some very aggressive Japanese players.

RS: In Holland go was always fighting. But here in Japan, even amateurs, they can play a game with surrounding territory, winning by two or three points. In Holland that would be impossible. For Japanese, even at a low level, in some way their goal is harmonious. They're not extreme. They are weak on all levels, if they are weak, but they are not strong at aggressive fighting and weak on other points.

GW: So go is a balance?

RS: Yes, that's what I really discovered. When you play a beautiful move, just the shape, the white and black stones on the board, then everything goes all right. I discovered that in Holland, just before I went to Japan, but in Japan I could actually see it. In Holland, if you try to play beautiful moves the shape will be destroyed by your opponent because he will play, oh, empty

triangles, and so on. But I really found that go was a completely different game played in the East than played in the West. Then I really learned to like go. Just enjoying the beautiful shapes would be nice enough for me.

GW: Do you think that's the strong part of your game, shapes?

RS: Well, it's the part I like, but I will not say it's the strong part of my game.

GW: What is the strong part of your game?

RS: I don't know. I'm the worst person to judge about my own games.

GW: But don't you feel that some part of your game is the best?

RS: I think if you compare with Western people, my game is quite balanced. If you compare with Japanese people, of course, it's totally horrible. That's what I learned in Japan.

I went back to Holland after three months. I never studied go much. I just travelled around with my father, going to go clubs he wanted to visit.

GW: So you don't read books?

RS: No, no. But when I was 16 . . . Well, I was the only young boy in Holland who could play go. To me, go is a kind of art. And like any art, it's important to learn it at a young age. If you learn to play violin at the age of 15, it's really too late.

I started at 8 or 9 or so, but all other people in Holland started when they were 20, so it was only natural, among such older people, that I became stronger much quicker. At 16, I became Dutch champion for the first time and I was very fortunate that in that year, Japan Air Lines had their first amateur go championship. So when I was 17, I participated in the first World Amateur Go Championship.

Then, after that championship or the second one, the whole European team was invited to Korea. The Korean Go Association decided to invite one European player to stay at the house of a professional for a year and the government would sponsor him. It sounded really fantastic. It was just before I graduated from school and all the other members of the European team were already working, or involved in their studies, so everybody looked at me, as though to say, well, you will be the first to do that. Of course, at that time, I thought it would be ideal, just before entering university to study go for a year.

But then a month later, Mr. Nagahara, the professional, came to Holland on his own. He's like a second Mr. Iwamoto, you know, supporting international go. At that time he wasn't spon-

sored by the Nihon Ki-in. He stayed at our home in Holland for three weeks. I mentioned that there was a chance I could go to Korea for one year. Then he said that if I'm going to study go for a year, I should come to Japan. He spoke to the Nihon Ki-in to see if I could become an insei for a year.

GW: So actually you became an insei for a year?

RS: Yes. Mr. Nagahara talked to Mr. Nakanori, the owner of a chain of sushi shops and the go club Tengen. Mr. Nagahara arranged to have Mr. Nakanori give me lodging for a year. That was the biggest problem, because we didn't have money for me to spend a year in Japan. Then the Nihon Ki-in allowed me to study as an insei for one year. I was already a first-year medical student, so it was clear from the beginning that it would only be for one year.

I was also told upon my arrival in Japan that I should keep that as a secret. You are not allowed to become an insei if you don't really have the intention of becoming a professional. It's so many years past, I can say it now.

GW: So your intention was only to study for one year?

RS: Yes, but the unfortunate thing is that after starting as insei number 43 (out of 65), I was insei number one when I left.

GW: Which is next to being promoted to professional?

RS: Yes, if you keep that place, which I don't know that I could have, until the promoting tournaments. If I end up as number one, then I become professional. But it was July and the next promoting tournament would be February or March of the next year.

GW: Did you think about staying and becoming professional?

RS: No, I didn't.

GW: You really didn't want to?

RS: No.

GW: Why not?

RS: Well, several reasons. First, a long time ago, I made up my mind not to make a job of my hobbies. Until the age of 18, I didn't study go. So I thought I would give it a try becoming an insei, because it would be my first time studying go in earnest. So if I could become 6-dan without studying, then maybe I could become stronger when I did start to study. That's what made me convince myself that I should try it.

But actually I spent much more time on music than go. I really love classical music and I

play piano and violin. I've played violin longer than I've played go and I've been playing in orchestras since I was 15. I also thought about becoming a professional violinist when I was younger. Then many people advised me not to, because if you become a professional at your hobby, then you won't enjoy music as much as when you're an amateur. I had also heard the same thing from professional go players who attended the European Go Congress, before I became an insei.

GW: They couldn't enjoy go because it was their job?

RS: Yes. So with that in mind I already had decided that I would not become a professional. I wouldn't like to lose my love for my hobby.

GW: At that time had you decided you wanted to become a physician?

RS: Yes, and I was already studying in the first year. I could stop for one year, not more than that. If I stopped more than that, it wouldn't be for one or two years, but four years because you have to do military service if you don't study at university. I didn't want that.

GW: But go is still very important to you?

RS: Yes. I quit my dearest hobby of playing violin for go. It became too much, my studies plus go and violin. I had to choose two of the three, so I stopped playing violin, which is much regretted by my wife. She is a pianist, so she's lost the opportunity to play some piano-violin duets with me.

As an insei, I had a great opportunity to study with Yoda Norimoto. At this moment I feel ashamed, because every Monday and Friday I visited Mr. Ando's house as his disciple. Officially he was my teacher, but my real teacher was Yoda, who had just turned 14 and had become a professional shodan. Already he was very strong and he was such a good teacher. I feel bad that I spoiled so much of his time. Maybe if he hadn't used so much time teaching a stupid amateur like me, he would have already become Meijin or Honinbo by now.

GA: You seem to have a very Japanese feeling about if someone helps you, you feel you have to return that favor. Do you feel pretty comfortable in Japan?

RS: I feel very comfortable in Japan. It's very fortunate because Holland is a go country in Europe where everything is arranged in a good way. Dutch people are famous for arranging. For example, in other countries in Europe, people like to play go, but they spend their time playing,

not arranging. In Holland they arrange opportunities to teach young people.

Young people are invited from everywhere in Holland, especially schoolboys about the age of 10 to 18. Their travel expenses are paid by the Dutch Go Association. So even if they don't have cooperative parents, they can attend lessons every two weeks.

GW: I've heard that Holland is the strongest go-playing country in the world, outside the Orient.

RS: That's because of such arrangements.

GW: Why are they so interested in arranging for go, rather than chess, or do they also arrange for that?

RS: Of course chess is much better arranged for.

GW: But why is go so popular in Holland?

RS: It's because we have the fortune to have a few people who like arranging such things. They help spreading go instead of just enjoying it.

Anyway, when I returned to Holland, I got the opportunity to teach once every two weeks on Sunday, and from everywhere young people would gather, and it was really based on promoting go by teaching it to young people so that they could spread it to their go clubs at school, et cetera.

GW: Is go played much in schools in Holland?

RS: No, I think there are 20 to 23 schools which have go clubs. But in recent years it's in a little bit of a slump. The biggest problem with promoting it is that although there are people who try to do their best, we don't have people in the *right* positions, like the director of Japan Air Lines or Fujitsu directors who like to play go themselves. We don't have those companies or newspaper or television people who are interested in go, so it's very hard to get something written about go in Holland. That's why go is growing very slowly.

GW: Are you the European Champion now?

RS: Not at this moment. The two years before I was European champion.

GW: How do you feel about playing in the Fujitsu Cup?

RS: I feel it's quite a pity that I gave such a bad performance. Last time I played with Nie Weiping (see GW52) and during the game I didn't have confidence in my play at all, but after the game I was told by many people, professionals, that until the middle game, I was doing quite well.

There are even people who said I was leading in the early middle game, so . . . Of course, it's much nicer to lose to a strong player than doing what I did in this year's Cup.

I try to come to Japan a week before major tournaments like this to visit my former teacher, Mr. Ando, and study with the pros there. But this time I was too busy, so I only got here two days before the tournament. Even if I didn't have jet-lag I can't say I would have played any better because I'm really a weak amateur.

GW: I don't think you're that weak. Will you continue representing Holland in the World Amateur Go Championship?

RS: Not so often. Even if I become the Dutch champion every year, which I have whenever I was in Holland since I was 16, I can only be the representative every two or three years, since they like to give others a chance to participate.

GW: What's the go situation in Europe now? Are more people playing?

RS: Well, it's expanding, but too slowly. It's like I told you, the right people in the right places aren't that interested in go.

GW: Anything special you'd like to say about go?

RS: I like go very much, especially when it's played harmoniously.

GW: But go is competitive. I mean the point is to win.

RS: But the year when I studied as an insei, I had to be very patient . . .

GW: Insei are very competitive, aren't they?

RS: Yes, but the competitiveness in Europe or the U.S. is mixed with feelings of aggressiveness. I learned that aggressiveness comes to nothing. What Western people call aggressiveness is actually bluntness. Pure aggressiveness is actually quite patient, quite hidden in patient moves which are anytime able to burst out. That's real aggressiveness. So it was a year of learning patience for me, not to give into my usual bluntness, because I'm just a product of Western society.

GW: So that year changed your view of go?

RS: I think so, yes.

GW: Do you think go has much of a connection with the way we live? Is there anything we can learn from go?

RS: Of course. You can learn everything from go, and you can apply it to your life.

GW: Any examples? You mentioned patience.

RS: I think Takagawa Shukaku Honinbo said

it once, that go is the art of harmony and it's really important to find that. In the beginning, when I was 12 or so, I found that beauty is important. If it's beautiful, it's going all right. But it's not only that. Every quality in go . . . Well, Japanese people talk about go stones having a heart — *ishi no kokoro* — so, wherever you put your stones, it expresses your inner feelings.

In every characteristic, you should try to find the middle way between passiveness and aggressiveness, being scared and being brave, being greedy and being generous. Between every characteristic, you have to find the middle way.

Your attitude is very important. You should recognize such emotions in yourself, so actually go is not a *game*. You mentioned go as being very competitive. You meant go as competitive with your opponent, but I don't agree. I think go is competitive with yourself, because that is who

you have to conquer. You have to control your extreme emotions, such as when you see your opponent trying to scare you or playing a move in the middle of what you thought would be your territory. If you react to that emotionally, by being afraid or aggressive, or whatever, then your move won't be good.

The most important thing is to conquer your own weakness, rather than the weak playing of your opponent. If you try to find the middle way and conquer your own weaknesses and then apply this attitude to your daily life, it would be good. Unfortunately, my own daily life isn't so harmonious, I'm afraid.

GW: Nobody's is.

RS: So if I win in an ugly way, I feel bad, but if I lose in a nice way, I feel very good.

GW: Thank you very much.



News (continued from page 6)

Manfred Wimmer 6-dan of Austria headed a large group on six points.

Matthew Macfadyen won the European Championship title and, with 71 points, came second in the European Grand Prix rankings behind Yoo Jong-su on 106 points. Macfadyen also topped the Fujitsu Cup rankings with 51 points, so he will represent Europe in the 1990 Fujitsu Cup in Tokyo. He was followed by Robert Rehm

5-dan of Holland on 27 points and Frank Janssen on 25.

The Computer Championship was won by Mark Boon's Goliath 2, which did not drop a game. Eindhoven (Netherlands) won the town team tournament. Yoo won the weekend tournament and the lightning tournament for strong players.


(From EGF Newsletter No. 11)

How to Attack the Two-Space Extension

Kamimura Kunio 8-dan

The theme diagram below shows a common fuseki pattern. One also often sees a two-space extension like White 1 and 3 here that is blocked from expanding along the side in either direction. Are these two white stones strong or are they weak? In this article, I would like to analyse the ways of attacking this formation. When one takes

a close look at a theme like this, one discovers that there are many attacking techniques that have become established as standard patterns. These patterns often appear in actual play, so if you learn them you can be 100% confident that they will prove useful in your own games.




Theme diagram: the two-space extension

Attack 1: The Knight's Move


Dia. 1 (expanding a moyo). Black applies pressure to the two-space extension while endeavouring to expand his own moyo. Depending on how White answers, Black hopes to acquire momentum for solidifying his moyo.

Black 1 is clearly a good move here because it works in concert not only with the three black stones in the bottom right sector of the board but also with the two marked stones on the bottom left.


Dia. 2 (unsatisfactory). Black 1 is too simple: it shows a lack of forcefulness. It gives White the chance to make a nice defensive jump to 2, which strengthens his two-space extension without making him overconcentrated.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (solidifying the moyo). If White answers 1 by attaching at 2, Black's hane at 3 works well. If White 4, Black can connect at 5: he has both expanded and strengthened his moyo.

Dia. 4 (Black is satisfied). The aim of White 1 is to avoid helping Black to strengthen his moyo. However, if Black strikes at his weak point at 2, White has little choice but to exchange 3 for Black 4, an exchange for which Black will be grateful.



Dia. 4



Dia. 5


Dia. 5 (White is thin). Well, what if White tries the other knight's move? This time Black will play 2, his next aim being to strike at 'a'. Once again Black is satisfied.

Dia. 6 (peaceful). Jumping to 1 is a peaceful move. White 'a' will be sente against the corner, so Black doesn't have any really effective attack. Even so, it should be clear that Black has gained from the exchange of the marked stone for White 1.




Kamimura Kunio 8-dan

Born on 18 March 1946, entered the Kitani school in 1957, became shodan in 1962, reached 8-dan in 1985. His main achievements to date have been entering the 14th Meijin league (just concluded) and the final stage of the current Kisei tournament. He is married to former women's amateur champion Tsutsumi Kayoko.



Dia. 6




Dia. 7


Dia. 7 (tenuki). If White ignores the marked black stone, then Black makes a severe attack with 1 and 3. When White plays 4, Black 'leans' on the white stone at the top: his attack is moving into top gear.

Dia. 8 (crude) (next page). Though played with the same purpose as the knight's move, the diagonal move of 1 has to be called a crude move. When White moves out with 2, Black finds that his attack on White lacks forcefulness, while 1 does not work effectively in enclosing territory.

Dia. 9 (gote). The attach-and-extend combination of 1 and 3 is doubtless a powerful attack, but Black clearly ends in gote after 5, which makes this strategy dubious.



Dia. 8




Dia. 9

Attack 2: The Shoulder Hit Plus Contact Play


Dia. 1 (sealing White in). The aim of the 1-3 combination is to stop White from moving into the centre from the marked stone. Blocking White's way out here indicates that Black's strategy is to build a moyo. However, playing like this helps White to strengthen his two-space extension, so you don't adopt this strategy when you want to attack.

One cannot say that Black 1 and 3 are best in this fuseki, but there is no doubt that they are powerful moves.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2 (favourable for Black). If White wants to, he can poke his head out with 1 to 5, but Black makes a big gain by cutting off the white stone up to 8, so this result is unquestionably favourable for him. The atari of 6 is also a satisfying move.




Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (thick). If White plays 1 to 5, Black builds thickness. Moreover, the white group is not completely settled yet, as Black can aim at attacking his eye shape with 'a'.

Dia. 4 (standard continuation). White will probably continue after Dia. 1 by turning at 1. After the moves to 6, the fight comes to a pause. Black has achieved his objective.



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (reverse of what Black wants).

Amateurs often play the same combination from the opposite direction, but this result is the reverse of what Black should be trying for. Build-

ing thickness at the top is meaningless, while White 4 and 8 erase Black's moyo potential below. Make sure you avoid this kind of play.

Dia. 6 (an illustration). This is a game between Kitani Minoru and Sakata (black) that I remember well. The aim of Black 1 was to make White answer at 'a', after which Black planned to surround a large centre by attaching at 9. Kitani skilfully parried the attack by switching to 2 and 4. This game demonstrates how reluctant professionals are to do what the opponent wants.



Dia. 6

Attack 3: The Capping Move

Dia. 1 (pinning one's hopes on attack). We would now like to look at the capping move, but please note that this is a different fuseki from the one in the theme diagram at the beginning of the article.


The aim of Black 1 is to expand the bottom moyo while attacking White. If White 2, Black also makes a one-space jump. The peep of Black 'a' will be an important threat for later. Perhaps one can say that the capping move is the standard way of attacking the two-space extension.

Dia. 2 (inappropriate). Making the capping move in the fuseki in the original theme diagram we have been looking at so far would be inappropriate, as White would just poke his head through the gap at 2, that is, into the area where Black is trying to build a territorial moyo. That's hardly interesting for Black.


Dia. 3 (blocking White's path). Note that in this fuseki Black can block White's path with 3.

Dia. 4 (limiting the moyo). If White gets a chance to play here first, jumping to 1 is a good move. Black has to answer at 2 or 'a', but either way his territory at the bottom has been limited


and he has nothing to look forward to. Black's aim above all must be to expand this bottom moyo.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (wrong direction). For the same reason, capping at 1 is a mistake in direction: it only helps White to play a move that he wanted to anyway.

Dia. 6 (the peep). The question now is what follow-up attacks Black has after Dia. 1. The first attack that occurs to one is the effective peep at 1. If White connects at 2, Black 3 is a good follow-up. White has to flee for his life.




Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Dia. 7 (heavy). White could save the marked stone by playing 1 and 3, but after 4 he has no eye shape, so his group is very heavy.

Dia. 8 (unreasonable for Black). The result in the previous diagram is bad for White, so usually he answers the peep with White 2. Black 3 next does not work well when White blocks at 4; if Black cuts at 'a', White moves out with 'b'.



Dia. 8




Dia. 9


Dia. 9 (bad aji). Attempting to seal White in with 1 and 3 is conceivable. However, Black has a

little bad aji in this shape, as White can play 'd', aiming to utilize the threat of White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.

Dia. 10 (blockade). The follow-up of Black 3 is a stylish move, the aim of which is to seal White off from the centre. If White 'a', Black cuts at 'b'.




Dia. 10




Dia. 11

Dia. 11 (a strong move). Just for reference, I'd like to show you a strong attack that Black can make here. If he attaches inside at 1, the continuation to 7 is pretty much forced. Black is happy because he had made the marked white stone look silly; on the other hand, he has hurt his own marked stone, so this strategy is not always a good one.

Dia. 12 (surprisingly strong). Here's another strong move. Black 1 doesn't look flashy, but I recommend it, as it's actually very severe.



Dia. 12




Dia. 13


Dia. 13 (Black's harvest). If White 1, Black 2

and 4 set up two cutting points. If 6, Black can capture two stones with 8 and 10. In certain positions, Black might prefer to cut at 8 instead of 6; White would follow the proverb by capturing the cutting stone with White 10, so Black could follow up with Black 6, then Black 7, separating the outside stones from the group.

Dia. 14 (tesuji counter). If White dodges to 1, to avoid the result in Dia. 13, Black counters with the tesuji of 2, cutting across the knight's move. If White 'a' after 6, then Black 'b' through 'd' follow.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15


Dia. 15 (large-scale attack). If instead White tries the diagonal move of 1, Black has no good way of making a direct attack on White's base. However, White doesn't have eye shape on the side, so attacking the whole group with 2 will be a powerful strategy.

Attack 4: The Placement


Dia. 1 (taking away White's base). The aim of Black 1 is to steal White's base so he can't make eye shape. If White uses 2 to block at 5, Black will link up by attaching at 'a'. However, Black cannot expect to be able to make an effective attack unless his neighbouring positions are very strong. In this fuseki, for example, White will answer simply with 2 and 4 and run no risk of being subjected to a severe attack.

If Black's aim is to take territorial profit, moves like 1 to 5 are much too small to be worth playing.


Dia. 2 (variation). White has scope to create complications, so playing 1 may lead to a difficult fight. Black 'a', White 'b', Black 'c', White 'd' might follow after 4.



Dia. 1





Dia. 2



Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (the right time and the right place). If, for example, Black had the impressive thickness on the outside that he does here, then attacking White's base with 1 or 'a' would initiate a severe attack. Of course, even here attacking with Black 'b' looks more severe.






Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (an illustration). This is an old game, between the late Takagawa Shukaku, Honorary Honinbo, and Fujisawa Shuko (black). I would like to ask you to look carefully at the neighbouring positions to see why White decided to attack at 1. White has solidified his left side and bottom positions with the three marked stones, so the necessary preparations for an attack are complete. By stealing Black's base, he is hoping, if things go right, to engineer a double attack on this group and the two marked black stones at the bottom. When all the surrounding conditions are favourable like this, then 1 becomes a good move.


Attack 5: Shoulder Hit Plus Extension

Dia. 1 (the cut). This time we're going to start immediately with an illustration from a game. It's one between Cho Chikun Honinbo (black) and Fujisawa Shuko from this year's Meijin league. The game is well into the middle game. Black's aim by attacking the thin two-space extension with 1 and 3 is to take some quick profit. Up to 11 he cuts off two stones. Note that if White changes 4 to 5, Black will play at 'a'.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2 (losing points). Instead of 7 in Dia. 1, Black could cut at 1 here, enabling him to capture two stones with 3 and 5. In this position, however, letting White make nice shape with 2 and 4 would be a mistake; White can play 'a' in sente and can link up to his two stones above with 'b', so Black loses rather than gains by playing like this.



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


Dia. 3 (profitless). White achieves nothing by trying to poke his head out with 4; up to 9, he foolishly helps Black to build thickness. The marked black stone is in just the right position.

Dia. 4 (helping White). Black 1 is the wrong shoulder hit. When White turns at 4, moving into the centre, Black has gained nothing. Black can block at 'a', but with his extension at the bottom (the marked stone) so close, he has no cause for celebration.


Dia. 5 (an overplay). When the neighbouring areas of the board are empty, as here, then Black 1 and 3 are not appropriate. Black may be able to split White into two, but when the latter extends at 12, the thinness of Black's position is only too apparent. This attack was obviously an overplay.

This concludes my discussion of methods of attacking the two-space extension. In a brief article it is not possible to go into too much detail, but I hope the foregoing analysis will serve, as a start, to give you some idea of the various strategies you can adopt. It should also have been of some help to the defender, the player who has set up the two-space extension.

(*'Kido'*, October 1989. Translated by John Power.)



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Attacking the Two-Space Extension: Problems

O Meien 8-dan


Below is a selection of problems for the reader to practise the techniques they have just learnt in the preceding article. However, in fairness we should mention that the solutions to two of the problems are moves not covered by Kamimura. Even worse, the solution to another is a move which he condemned as slack. That doesn't mean

that O disagrees with Kamimura; rather, any move is good or bad only if it matches the overall position. We have chosen problems with the aim not only of illustrating but also of extending Kamimura's analysis. As a rule, of course, the problems can be solved by applying the right standard pattern.




Problem 1: Black to play

Black has to bear two things in mind: his moyo potential at the bottom and the slight weakness of his position in the top right corner. With the right attack on the two-space extension, he can kill two birds with one stone.




Problem 2: Black to play

Black has set up the mini-Chinese opening pattern at the bottom. What is the best way to build it up into a moyo? Please note that the answer is not one of the techniques covered in the preceding article.



Problem 3: Black to play


White's two stones look very lonely deep inside the immense black moyo. It may look as if any attack will be good enough, but still Black must look for the best move, so that he can extract maximum profit from the situation.



Problem 5: White to play


This has obviously been a leisurely game, without much fighting. The black two-space extension on the top left is not glaringly weak, so perhaps a severe attack is not feasible. Which move best matches the tenor of the game?

In this case, Kamimura's article won't help.




Problem 4: Black to play

Here also the two white stones look rather lonely, but the overall position is quite different from that in Problem 3, so a different method of attack is called for. First, you must think about what your objective should be.




Problem 6: Black to play

Black has a wall of steel above, a moyo below, and two solitary white stones in between. From which direction should he attack? This should be an easy problem, both for those who have read Kamimura's article and for those who know their go proverbs.




Problem 7: Black to play

The most wide-open area, and therefore the one with the most value, is the top, but simply adding a stone there to enclose it would show a disappointing lack of technique. Attacking White's two-space enclosure in the right way will create momentum for enclosing the top. Note that this is not meant to be an easy problem.




Problem 9: Black to play

We have yet another weak white position in between two strong black positions. What is the best way to harass White? This is a difficult problem, but you are just asked to find Black's first two moves.



Problem 8: Black to play

White has already made two jumps into the centre from his two-space extension, but still he is quite weak, as he is surrounded by very strong black positions above and below. What is the best way for Black to take advantage of his superiority to inflict some serious damage on White? The answer involves a standard attacking pattern.



Problem 10: White to play


In a sense this problem is different from the preceding ones. You are asked to find a white move to attack the two-space black extension on the side, but White's real aim is to attack the marked black stones at the centre bottom.

Answers begin on page 48.


Attacking the Two-Space Extension: Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Capping at 1 is the only move. This immediately gives depth to what was a flat, shallow moyo at the bottom. Moreover, White can hardly let Black continue by attacking at 'a', so he has to do something.



Dia. 1: the only move




Dia. 2: attack is the best defence


Dia. 2. Jumping to 2 is the only move for White. This makes jumping to 3 a good move for Black: it both attacks White and strengthens Black's top right position. If next White 4, aggressive players might find it interesting to continue the attack by capping at 5. So long as Black's attack continues, White won't have time to do anything about the black territories above and below.

Dia. 3. Simply jumping to 1 doesn't give Black's attack any rhythm. After White 2, Black has little choice but to defend at 3, so White reinforces at 4, making his group immune to attack.

That means that Black still has to worry about the thinness of his group above.




Dia. 3: slack



Dia. 4: no pressure

Dia. 4. The 1-3 combination is a standard technique when Black wants to expand his moyo, and in this game too it is quite strong. One cannot overlook the drawback, however, that White definitely secures his group up to 8. Compared to Dias. 1 and 2, where White is not given a chance to stop for breath, this variation is undeniably inferior.




Dia. 5: too low


Dia. 5. Black 1 is a mistake which shows that Black has failed to understand the overall position properly. This placement is effective when Black has strong positions nearby so that he can make an all-out attack on White by taking away his base, but in this case he just helps White to settle his group. Black's position at the bottom is still low and his top right group is still thin. He has achieved nothing.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. In posing the problem we gave a hint: Black wants to build up his bottom moyo. The best way to do this is by striking at White's shoulder with 1, even though this is not one of the techniques covered in Kamimura's article. That article, of course, was not meant to be exhaustive; you must decide each case on its own merits.



Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: success


Dia. 2. White 2 and 4 are one standard response to this kind of shoulder hit. The solid extension at 5 next is a key move. White's position is still thin, so he will be forced to add a reinforcement at 6. Black then switches to 7: virtually at one stroke he has completed a large territorial moyo at the bottom. Instead of 6 —

Dia. 3. If White switches elsewhere instead of reinforcing, Black rocks him with the strong punch at 2. If White 3, Black cuts by main force with 4 and 6 and immediately takes the lead. If

next White 'a', Black only builds greater thickness with 'b'.




Dia. 3: punishing the tenuki



Dia. 4: too straightforward

Dia. 4. Go is not such a simple game that one can dogmatically label Black 1 here a bad move, but it does seem to show a lack of ingenuity. The theme of the mini-Chinese opening is to expand one's moyo, forcing the opponent to come in so that one can attack him. From this standpoint, the knight's move in Dia. 1 certainly seems superior.






Dia. 5: wrong direction

Dia. 5. Black 1 attacks from the wrong direction. White can seize the opportunity to invade at the bottom at 2. Black can counter by separating him with 3 and 5, but then White has a good contact play at 6 to look after this group. Capturing White 2 will not be simple either, so Black is not really achieving anything. He has failed to make the most of his bottom area.

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the only move. It is the ideal attacking technique for expanding his moyo at the top.




Dia. 1: the only move


Dia. 2. If White resists with 2 and 4, Black will be only too happy at getting the chance to build thickness with 3 and 5. Black is forcing White to move towards his steel wall below; this is the ideal way to use his thickness there. If instead of 2 White jumps to 'a' —

Dia. 3. Black continues to attack severely by striking at 1. If White 2, Black keeps up the pres-


sure with 3 and 5; White is unable to secure eye shape and, faced with the lowering black wall below, his future looks bleak.



Dia. 2: driving White towards thickness



Dia. 3: in trouble




Dia. 4: also good for Black


Dia. 4. In this position the 1-3 combination is also very strong. As he struggles to live, White is forced to help Black build powerful thickness in the centre. Note that if Black switched 1 to a placement at 'a', then after White 'b', Black 2, White 1, Black 'c', White would jump to 7 and would probably not come under much pressure.

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. When Black has so much thickness on the outside, there is no reason not to make an all-out attempt to kill White. The best way to set about it is to take away his base with 1.



Dia. 1: an aggressive attack




Dia. 2: can White live?

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black naturally extends at 3: he refuses to give White even one eye on the side. If next White 4, the key is to switch to 5; there is no danger of being captured, as 'a' and 'b' are miai. White is going to have a lot of trouble making two eyes, but even if he does, it doesn't matter: in the process Black will take


plenty of profit.

Dia. 3. The result in the previous diagram is painful for White, so he is likely to try a different variation. Sacrificing a stone with 2 and 4 looks like an improvement, but even so Black will be satisfied with the expansion in his territory when he plays 3. Also, he can still look forward to continuing his attack.




Dia. 3: Black is satisfied

Dia. 4. Black's judgement will be called into question if he attacks from below with a move like Black 1. White 2 and 4 immediately settle the group. Getting stones in place at 1 and 3 does nothing for Black: look at how strong the white group below is. His attack has backfired.



Dia. 4: helping White




Dia. 5: wrong direction


Dia. 5. Capping at 1 unfortunately shows that Black has no sense of direction. Black 'forces' White to move out towards the bottom with 2, which means that Black gets no chance to use his thickness at the top. The way to use thickness is to force the opponent to move towards it; in short, Black 1 is too close to Black's own thickness.

Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. This is a slow-paced game which looks like being decided in the endgame. The move best matching the overall position is White 1. If next Black 'a', then White 'b', and vice versa. White 1 is not a showy move, but it serves to reinforce the corner enclosure while attacking the two-space extension.




Dia. 1: correct



Dia. 2: Black's clever counter

Dia. 2. If White tries to scoop out Black's base with 1, he has a clever counter in the form of the contact play at 2. If White answers 2 directly, Black will descend at 'a' and capture White 1, so White 3 is forced. Black then hollows out the corner with 4; he is satisfied with this furikawari (trade). White's corner loss is substantial.


Dia. 3. Capping at 1 is slack. Black secures a solid base with 2 and 4, but 1 cannot be said to secure the centre for White. In fact, he has little potential there, so this sequence causes him to lose ground.



Dia. 3: White gains nothing

Answer to Problem 6


Dia. 1. The knight's move was the first technique taught by Kamimura. Black 1 also follows the proverb, 'make the opponent play towards your thickness'. If White 2, Black turns on the pressure with 3 and 5, pushing White closer to his strong wall above. This attack develops to the maximum the potential of the black moyo at the bottom.




Dia. 1: ideal expansion

Dia. 2. Capping at 3 also looks good, as Black has a good follow-up at 5 when White tries to poke his head through at 4. Black looks like securing a big territory at the bottom, so this can also be considered a correct answer.


Dia. 3. If Black attacks at 1, White will dodge to 2. Capturing a single stone with 3 is small; while Black is concerning himself with trivial profit, White builds a secure position inside the black moyo with 4 and 6. Black's attack was on too small a scale.



Dia. 2: also correct



Dia. 3: losing sight of the whole picture




Dia. 4: petty-minded

Dia. 4. The placement of 1 shows a player with small ambitions. Black gains a couple of points, but he doesn't put the whole group under any pressure. In fact, he just helps White to make


nice shape up to 8. Black doesn't have any thickness in the centre, so he has no prospect of continuing his attack. Anyone who chose this placement should ponder the differences between this position and Problem 4.

Dia. 5. Black 1 is just one line away from the correct answer, but that one line makes a big difference. Black 1 is an attack from the wrong direction, as it drives White into Black's moyo below, and, in contrast to Dia. 2, Black has no effective way of blocking his path.



Dia. 5: wrong direction

Answer to Problem 7




Dia. 1: correct


Dia. 1. The aim of Black 1 is to induce White to play 2, whereupon attacking with 3 and 5 works well. Black 3 is the vital point, so White has no choice but to reinforce with 4; that makes extending at 5 natural, so Black effortlessly encloses the top area. This sequence involves a high-level strategy, referred to in the go proverb,

‘when you want the left, play on the right’. Here Black wants to take the top, so he attacks from the bottom. Real skill in go means making the opponent help you to carry out your plans.

Dia. 2. If White answers at 2, then Black 3, preventing White from enclosing eye space, becomes the vital point. Black deliberately invites White to jump to 4, as this lets him enclose the top with 5 while continuing his attack on the still eyeless white group.



Dia. 2: a good attack




Dia. 3: too open


Dia. 3. Since one wants to enclose the top area, attacking at 1 may seem natural, but the problem is that Black's position at the top is too wide and open, so it will be easy for White to invade. When White makes the simple jumps to 2 and 4, he doesn't give Black any help in enclosing the top.

Dia. 4. Black 1 and 3 are a standard attacking combination; the drawback is that White definitely settles his group up to 8. If this group is secure,

White can switch to an invasion at the top without having to worry about it. This is a strategic failure for Black.



Dia. 4: wrong strategy




Dia. 5: unambitious

Dia. 5. Black 1 is a tame move: it shows that Black has no aggression in his soul. White is happy to jump to 2; Black gets no help in enclosing the top. This result is manifestly inferior to Dia. 1.


Answer to Problem 8

Dia. 1. The time has come for Black to reap the fruits of his attack on White's two-space extension. The best way of doing so, while also preventing the white group from stabilizing itself, is to cut off a stone with 1 and 3. Things now look grim for White.


Dia. 2. If White tries to escape with 4, Black counters with the excellent combination of 5 and 7. He doesn't expect to capture the group, but by attacking it he should be able to solidify all his neighbouring positions.



Dia. 1: a severe attack



Dia. 2: the attack continues




Dia. 3: counterattack unreasonable


Dia. 3. It's very tempting for White to counterattack at 1, but when Black plays 2, White quickly runs out of steam. If he pushes through the gap at 3, Black does likewise with 4; if next

White 'a', Black has a strong counter in the cut at 'b' — please check out the fight that follows by yourself.

Dia. 4. Crawling at 2 is a common answer to this kind of peep, but when Black has such a strong position at the top he can just push through at 3. After 7 White has no way of defending both his cutting points.




Dia. 4: two cutting points



Dia. 5: too slow

Dia. 5. Black 1 is much too slow: White dodges lightly to 2. Black then has to play 3 to stop him from making eye shape, so White jumps out to 4. Compared to the correct answer, Black's attack here clearly lacks force and speed. Of course, if White makes the mistake of playing 2 at 'a' Black will get a severe attack with 'b', White 'c', Black 3.

Answer to Problem 9




Dia. 1: the strongest attack


Dia. 1. When Black attacks from above, the severest combination is 1 and 3 here. Black's intention is to block White off from the centre by main force. Note that in this case playing 3 at 'a',

letting White wedge in at 3, would be a little slack.

Dia. 2. If White pushes up at 4, Black cuts with 7 and 9. Up to 11 he scores a clear success by cutting off the two white stones. White 12 doesn't hurt his position at the bottom, and White still has to get his second eye.



Dia. 2: a violent cut




Dia. 3: resistance unavailing

Dia. 3. White could counter by playing 1 in sente, then pushing up at 3, but Black hanes at 4, refusing to give way. If next White 'a', Black of course will resolutely cut at 'b'. If Black can seal White in on the side, he doesn't mind letting him live. Also, one must not overlook the fact that White 1 has helped Black to solidify his corner.


Dia. 4. If White simply connects at 1, Black 2 works perfectly, sealing him off from the centre. White is struggling on the inside while Black is taking control of the outside: it is clear who has the lead.

Dia. 5. In this position capping at 1 is not for-

ceful enough. Jumping to 2 relieves the pressure on the white group. If next Black 'a', White answers at 'b'. Black's attack lacks the severity it has in Dia. 1.



Dia. 4: successful blockade



Dia. 5: letting White off easy

Answer to Problem 10


Dia. 1. Jumping solidly to 1 is best. Black will probably jump to 2 to strengthen his group, so White can then switch to an attack on the stones to the right. Bear in mind that White can aim at attacking at 'a' at the right time. So long as he keeps the left-side black group and the one at the bottom from linking up, his attack will not run out of steam.

Dia. 2. White 1 attacks from the wrong direction: provoking Black 2 is bad. If Black adds a stone at 'a', his group will become immune to attack, yet if White attacks at 'a', Black will link up with 'b'.


Dia. 3. White 1 is too precipitate: he has

neglected to make the necessary preparations. Black will probably first jump to 2, eliminating his worries about the side group. If next White 'a', Black's plan is to attach at 'b'. This result makes it obvious that 2 is the vital point.


(From a supplement to 'Kido', November 1989)



Dia. 1: double attack



Dia. 2: wrong direction




Dia. 3: premature

Good Style and Correct Shape

Cho Chikun, Honinbo, Judan & Tengen


The aim of this series is to look at certain common shapes and positions and to teach the reader the standard techniques for attacking them. This should help you to develop your judgement and make you a better fighter.

In this issue we look at a standard technique for taking endgame profit. The two positions involve the same theme and are presented as problems for you to work out before you look at our analysis.



Problem 21: White to play

What is White's best endgame move against the corner group? It goes without saying that exchanging White 'a' for Black 'b' is not good enough. White has to find a way to make use of his marked stone.



Problem 22: White to play

The key is the presence of the marked white stone. How can White make use of it to take most endgame profit in the corner? Note that Black has an interesting counter besides the obvious answer.


Answers on page 58

Good Style and Correct Shape: Answers

Answer to Problem 21

Dia. 1. The clamp of White 1 is a standard tesuji, so probably quite a few of my readers got the right answer. In this article I want to look at the various ramifications of this move.

Black 2, of course, is an elementary mistake; White cuts at 3 and captures the two stones.




Dia. 1: wrong for Black

Dia. 2: standard

Dia. 2. Black must answer at 2. The moves to 6 will follow. White 'a' and Black 'b' will most likely follow later.

Dia. 3. Connecting at 2 is a little dubious. Though he ends in gote, White takes a lot of profit compared to Dia. 2.




Dia. 3: dubious

Dia. 4: illustration


Dia. 4. This is another example. How can White use the aji of the peep (the marked stone) he made earlier?

Dia. 5. Once again White can make the clamp at 1. If Black resists with 2, White cuts off two stones in the forced continuation. That means that Black has no choice but to play 2 at 4.



Dia. 5: wrong

Dia. 6. Here is another example. The question is whether Black can make the clamp at 'a'. Some careful reading is called for.




Dia. 6: illustration

Dia. 7: wrong

Dia. 7. Black 1 works. In answer, White must connect at 3 instead of 2. If he stubbornly descends at 2, he suffers a large loss.

Answer to Problem 22

Dia. 1. If Black resists the clamp, White can scoop out his base with 3 and 5. If we assume Black 'a', White 'b' next, then White has robbed Black of all his corner profit. This is a terrible result, so —



Dia. 1: bad for Black

Dia. 2: a little better

Dia. 2. The hane of 1 is the most resistance Black can offer. Up to 7 an exchange follows. This result is still a big success for White, as he captures a stone in sente.


Dia. 3. The question then becomes whether Black might not have a better answer to the clamp. One possibility is to dodge to Black 2. This invalidates White's sequence to 5 in Dia. 1, so he will ignore 2 and play at 3. Black then hanes at 4 — a kind of trade has taken place. Black can be more or less satisfied with his result. If White 3 at 4, Black of course descends at 'a'.

Dia. 4. This is an example of how not to play. Connecting at 2 is submissive; when White links up at 3, Black has lost his base and, unlike Dia. 3, received no compensation.


Dia. 5. White has a clever combination for stealing Black's base, but the timing of the moves is very important.

Dia. 6. White plays the clamp first, then


jumps to 3. Black plays 4 to prevent White from cutting at 'a', whereupon White links up with 5, leaving Black with only one eye in the corner. White has strengthened his two-space extension and damaged Black's position in the process, so he is very satisfied.




Dia. 3: even




Dia. 4: submissive




Dia. 5: timing



Dia. 6: success for White



Dia. 7: wrong timing



Dia. 8: correct

Dia. 7. If White changes the timing, playing 1 first, then Black will block at 2. White is able to hollow out Black's base with 3 and 5, but the presence of 2 weakens the marked stones above. White has to make sure that he plays his attacking combination in the right order, so that Black is not given the choice of changing his answer.

Dia. 8. In this case, connecting at 2 is the correct answer. In this position, White would never continue with White 'a', inviting Black 'b', but that, in effect, is what he has done in Dia. 7.


You should be able to make immediate use of this clamp tesuji in your own games.

(*'Kido'*, October 1986.)

On the Edge


Here are three life and death problems, the solutions to which are hinted at in the title above. In each case, a move by Black on the first line (not

necessarily the first move) is the key to killing the white group. That said, it's up to you to establish the correct *modus operandi*.




Problem 1: Black to play

White may feel that his group is safe, but Black has a surprise for him. This is a famous first-line problem.



Problem 2: Black to play

This is a bit more complicated. If you could kill this group in actual play (as opposed to as a problem in a magazine), then you'd be a dan-level player.



Problem 3: Black to play

A simple hane plus connection won't hurt White, but there's a right-left combination that will rock him. If you can solve this in one second, you're close to professional level.


Answers on page 60.

36 Tesuji Patterns

Sakata Eio, Hon. Honinbo


The tesujis we are looking at in this instalment are a bit of a mixture. The only common point is that they all come up with star-point josekis. The

fighting techniques involved are quite common ones, however, so we hope that you will find our brief analysis of some use in your own games.




Pattern 19: Black to play

When Black has a strong moyo, as he does here, White often attaches underneath the star-point stone rather than invading on the 3-3 point. If Black blocks on the outside, then White's hane at 1 is a stylish move. Sooner or later, you're going to have to learn how to deal with this kind of move, so let's start now.



Pattern 20: Black to play

First you have to ask yourself what White is aiming at when he plays the kosumi of 1. Then you have to work out how to stop him from getting it. This is another common pattern.



Pattern 21: Black to play

The position comes from a handicap-go joseki. White 1 looks like a nasty peep, but actually it is premature. Black must avoid answering submissively. *Answers on page 61.*

On the Edge: Answers

Continued from page 59

Answer to Problem 1


Dia. 1. If you've seen this tesuji before, the solution is easy. Simply playing 1 on the first line kills the white group. If White 2, Black can play in at 3, thanks to White's shortage of liberties.

Dia. 2. Resisting with 2 is futile: Black pushes in at 3, and White is again handicapped by his shortage of liberties.


Dia. 3. Black 1 helps White to live. If White pushes down at 2 before connecting at 4, he catches Black short of liberties (this is the oi-

otoshi tesuji).


Dia. 4. Black 1 goes in too far. When White ataris at 2, there's no way Black can stop 'a' from becoming an eye.




Dia. 1: White dies



Dia. 2: White dies




Dia. 3: White lives




Dia. 4: White lives.

Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. White's shape in this problem is similar to the previous one, but the crucial difference is that he has open liberties on top, so Black can't hope to use the same technique to kill him. Instead of descending, jumping down to the edge is the first move. If White 2, Black jumps in at 3, stopping him from making two eyes. Confirm for yourself that White has no way of capturing 3.




Dia. 1: dead




Dia. 2: dead

Dia. 2. White might answer at 2, in which case a simple hane at 3 will stop him from getting two eyes. If White 'a' instead of 2, the hane of 3 again kills him.

Dia. 3. Black 1 may look like the vital point, but the placement is a mistake, as White can resist with 2 and 4. The best Black can do now is to get a ko with 5. White's clever counter is worth remembering.



Dia. 3: wrong




Dia. 4: worst


Dia. 4. Descending at 1 is wrong: White has plenty of liberties, so the diagonal move in Problem 1 doesn't work.

Answer to Problem 3

Dia. 1. Black peeps once at 1, then jumps down to the first line: this combination is professional level. Black 3, in particular, is a brilliant move. Next —




Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: White dies

Dia. 2. The main problem arises when White descends at 4. If Black is not ready with the continuation of 5, his attack will end in an anticlimax. If White 6, Black 7 makes miai of 'a' and 'b', so White is dead.

Dia. 3. Black 3 is the wrong follow-up: it shows that finding Black 1 was just a fluke. After White hanes at 4, Black cannot link up his stone at 1, nor can he reduce White to one eye.



Dia. 3: White lives



Dia. 4: White lives


Dia. 4. If Black jumps down to 1 first, White will play at 2. Too late Black realizes this was the vital point: there is no way to kill White now. Black 1 at 'a' meets with the same answer.

(*'Let's Go'*, October 1981)

36 Tesuji Patterns: Answers

Continued from page 60.

Answer to Problem 19




Dia. 1: play solidly

Dia. 1. White could have lived easily by invading at 'a', but then Black would have forced him to live on a small scale. White therefore often tries the 3-4 contact play under the star-point stone, especially when Black has a moyo like the one here. In a sense, it is a probe to see how Black answers.

The best answer for Black is to connect solidly at 1. This stops White from trying anything fancy and guarantees a straightforward continuation.


Dia. 2. White will probably connect at 2, so 3 to 6 will follow. If Black later reinforces at 'a', he can get an approach-move ko by making a placement at 'b'.



Dia. 2: standard sequence

Dia. 3: wrong

Dia. 3. Black must not capture with 1 and 3. White gets a ladder with 4 and 6 and completely breaks up the corner.



Dia. 4: strongest


Dia. 4. Crawling at 3 is the strongest move, but there is no guarantee that it will succeed. Everything depends on two things: the surrounding position and the strength of the players. Here we show just one possible continuation. White plays 4 and 6, forcing Black 7, then creates complications by attaching at 8. Needless to say, he is aiming at cutting off the black stone to the right.

Answer to Problem 20


Dia. 1. White's aim in making the diagonal move was to fix up his shape and to aim at the gap in Black's formation. Black's best move is simply to plug the gap with 1; this may seem submissive and slow, but, considering the white strength in the area, playing solidly is the best policy.

Dia. 2. If White 2, defending at 3 is important to ensure that Black secures a base. In this position Black 'a' will be a severe attack: that's why Black connected solidly at 1.


Dia. 3. Black 1 is a solid move which you will find in some joseki books. We can't say that it is bad, but it does leave White with some aji to aim at. Namely —



Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: a severe follow-up aim




Dia. 3: a book move but ...

Dia. 4. The idea is that if White pushes through at 1, Black will answer at 2, but if White keeps coming through at 3 regardless, he becomes thick in the centre. Depending on the overall position, Black may well find this result disagreeable.



Dia. 4: White's centre thickness

Answer to Problem 21




Dia. 1: correct

Dia. 1. The key point to bear in mind here is that when White has a cutting point at 'a', his peep does not work. Black's counter is to block

once at 1, then to connect at 3 to exploit White's shortage of liberties here. White's attack is now doomed to fail. Next —

Dia. 2. If White defends his cutting point with 4, Black intercepts with 5; if White cuts at 8, Black counters at 9 and wins the semeai (capturing race). White's attack is an abortive failure.




Dia. 2: White fails

Dia. 3. If White connects at 4, Black cuts at 5. Whatever happens in the ensuing fight, White can't hope to get a good result.


Dia. 4. Timidly connecting at 1 is too submissive. After 2, Black must connect at 3; if next White 'a', the whole black group loses its eye

shape. Black has let White get away with his unreasonable attack.

(*'Let's Go'*, July 1983.)



Dia. 3: good for Black




Dia. 4: what White wants

36 Life and Death Patterns

Kato Masao, Oza




The problems in this issue do not really have a common theme, but the answers all involve capturing stones rather than simply making eye shape. That hint should help you get started.




Problem 19: Black to play

Black has one eye in the centre, but getting another on the side looks quite difficult. This problem requires a lot of reading.



Problem 20: Black to play

With so little room to play around with, it's not going to be easy for Black to make eye shape. The solution is to enlist White's aid, that is, to force him to play a stone inside that one can capture.



Problem 21: White to play


'Six live, eight die', says the proverb, so with only six points on the edge, White should die. However, his captured stone has a lot of aji, so there's no need to give up hope yet.

Answers on page 64.


36 Life and Death Patterns: Answers

Answer to Problem 19

Dia. 1. You can't solve this problem unless you know the famous 'under-the-stones' tesuji (ishi no shita). Black starts by blocking at 1, though by normal means this will not provide an eye. After 5 —




Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: alive

Dia. 2. If White 6, Black must connect at 7. After 8, he ataris (where the marked stone is) and captures two stones. This is the only way of making an eye on the edge.

Dia. 3. If instead Black captures at 1, White 2 makes this a false eye. Black must sacrifice the four marked stones to live.



Dia. 3: dead




Dia. 4: dead


Dia. 4. If Black 1, he can't get an eye after White 2; if he blocks, White 'a'.

Answer to Problem 20

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the vital point. If White 2, Black drops back to 3, securing one eye and forcing White to come in at 4. When he connects at 5, White can't save this stone. If Black plays 3 at 'a' or 5, White will strike at the vital point of 3 and kill him. The point of 1 is that it makes miai of 2 and 3.




Dia. 1: correct




Dia. 2: alive

Dia. 2. If White attacks the key point for eye space with 2, Black descends at 3. White has to come in at 4 to stop Black from making two eyes, but then the result is a seki, so Black lives.

Dia. 3. If Black 1, White easily kills him with 2. If instead 1 at 2, White exchanges 1 for Black 'a', then kills him with a placement at 3.



Dia. 3: dead




Dia. 4: dead


Dia. 4. Turning inside at 1 doesn't create eye shape. White kills him with the 2-4 combination.

Answer to Problem 21

Dia. 1. The vital first step is to probe Black's intentions by attacking with 1. If, and only if, he begins with this move, White can live. If Black 2, White throws in at 3; Black can't capture 3, so White continues with 5, making 'a' into an eye. The group is alive.




Dia. 1: alive




Dia. 2: alive

Dia. 2. The only other choice Black has is to connect at 2, but then White 3 becomes sente, so again White lives.

Dia. 3. Changing the order of moves spoils everything. If White 1 first, then White 3 is too late.



Dia. 3: dead



Dia. 4: ko

Dia. 4. If White starts with a throw-in at 1, he does get a ko, but this is not good enough. ('Let's Go', July 1983)

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